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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the natural gas market to France, Italy and Spain by proposing an 
econometric model for the consumption of gas in the residential and industrial sectors of 
these countries and a discreet choice model for the decision making of investment in import 
infrastructure and partner choice. Results from the above work is integrated in an object- 
oriented model aiming to generate benchmarks on trade flows to France, Italy and Spain. 
The thesis also looks at the prospects for the LNG market and critically discusses the 
problematic of security of supply with liberalisation of markets against the background of 
changes within the Mediterranean market. 
Primary information and analysis is an initial contribution of the thesis. The thesis also 
contributes in terms of the results in the consumption modelling, including the effect of 
weather on residential gas consumption. Also, the discreet choice model shows a clear 
pattern in decision making pre-gas liberalisation in Europe and shows, numerically, the drive 
towards diversification of partners. Finally, the object-oriented model shows scenario driven 
benchmarks for the choices of partners, suggesting, inter-alia, an even supply for France, an 
over-supply for Italy and an under-supply for Spain. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy markets are going through a tremendous amount of change: Oil prices appear to 
have undergone a structural change; China and India are emerging as large and growing 
sources of consumption and are henceforth becoming price drivers. As environmental 
awareness is more established and as the Kyoto protocol comes into force, the debate about 
the usage of nuclear power generation is at the forefront of many national energy policies 
and unprecedently high amounts of investment are going into research and development of 
renewable technologies. As electricity consumption is also growing at high rates, natural gas 
and coal are in fierce competition. 
The world security paradigm, particularly in OECD countries, has also shifted. As an 
increasingly higher share of their consumption comes from imports, security of supply is 
also at the height of energy policies, from a logistical perspective and from a geopolitical one. 
The change, however, that natural gas and LNG are witnessing is even more spectacular as 
current world trade capacity is expected to double within the next five to ten years, with an 
uncertain international market structure. Indeed, as deregulation is implemented in many 
consuming markets, triggered by the US and the UK and followed by the EU, Japan and 
Korea, profound changes are poised to reshape the natural gas industry, very certainly with 
an effect on security of supply. 
One of the issues of consideration is the trade-off between security of supply and market 
liberalization. As markets are free and competitive, and there is an increase in market players, 
investment in infrastructure is not necessarily inline with consumption as the decision 
making process shifts from the macro (government and monopoly utility) to the micro (firm 
and independent regulator) level. Markets are likely at times to be over-supplied or under- 
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supplied and definitely more cyclical, as competitive industries that are constrained 
infrastructurally, like shipping, tend to be. More importantly, as incumbent utilities do not 
enjoy their status of legal monopolies, profit maximization will constrain reinvestment in 
infrastructure, especially at times of low prices, with all the potential security of supply 
concerns that this may entail. 
The Mediterranean 
-or the south European market and some North African suppliers- is a 
very particular and interesting region to study- particularly as it is an area where academic 
interest in natural gas remains limited. The largest natural gas markets in this area (France, 
Italy and Spain) have many interesting particularities: they have low-reserves and low- 
production in gas; they have booming natural gas consumption; they are undergoing industry 
changes through market liberalization with a reasonably similar timing; and they maintain a 
mix of pipeline/LNG imports with an increasingly well diversified portfolio of suppliers. 
These suppliers range from the usual pipeline exporters: Algeria, Norway, the Netherlands 
and Russia to new LNG entrants like Trinidad & Tobago, Egypt, Qatar, Nigeria and others. 
This thesis will look at the past patterns of natural gas consumption in the markets above 
and look into potential forecast scenarios. Further it will also look at past decision making 
patterns in term of partner diversification and infrastructure investment under the previous 
industry status (legal monopolies) and proposes a model for capacity building and long term 
contracts based on the decision making processes of the buyers above. This thesis does not 
aim to offer capacity forecasts, rather it aims to offer a platform of comparison between 
current market developments and how they should have been, if natural monopolies and 
macro-level decision making are assumed to be optimal for capacity investment and partner 
choice. 
The contribution of the present thesis is threefold. On the substance, the research included 
primary information collection, including formal interview and less structured discussions 
with market players, governments, inter-governmental organizations, consulting firms and 
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think-tanks. Data in regards to different infrastructure outlets and long 
-term contracts was 
also gradually collected from different sources. On methodology, the research introduces a 
simple, user-friendly, easy-to-construct, object oriented simulation tool with scenarios 
capability. On results, the thesis offers insightful answers to current industry questions, in 
relation, for instance, to elasticities of consumption and over/under-supply in some markets. 
In effect, this research is one of few pioneers in LNG trade modelling in the region and 
globally. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis starts off by offering some basic facts about natural gas and LNG 
and will move on to discussing supply/demand factors and international trade patterns. This 
chapter demonstrates the unique properties of natural gas and will offer some initial grounds 
why it should not be treated in the same context as other commodities. Chapter 3 will have a 
deeper focus into the area of interest, looking at the current and expected import/export 
infrastructure in France, Italy and Spain and their respective suppliers. It will also address 
supply and demand patterns and will discuss in more detail the EU market liberalization. 
Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive consumption analysis for natural gas in the markets, from 
different angles. This chapter investigates the importance of macro-economic variables on 
the consumption and looks forward into how this consumption is likely to evolve. This 
chapter will look at natural gas consumption with less emphasis on power generation 
demand whose estimation is more appropriately addressed using a lengthy bottom-up 
(plant-by-plant analysis) approach, already available in the literature at the EU scale. 
The fifth chapter looks into the decision-making determinants in terms of infrastructure 
investment and "partner choice". Putting consumption and decision making patterns 
together, the sixth chapter proposes the Dynamic Object Oriented System, which simulates 
nc w terminals and new contracts in the market 
-allowing for scenarios- based on 
consumption forecasts and decision making. The thesis ends by offering results, conclusions 
and potential for future work. 
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2. Overview of the Natural Gas and LNG Industry 
This chapter will provide an overview about various aspects of natural gas and natural gas 
trade as well as critically discuss potential future trends in LNG markets. 
Natural gas is a fossil fuel source of primary energy. It has been the fastest growing energy 
source for the past thirty years taking market share from oil and coal. It now represents 
around a quarter of the world's primary, energy consumption. This growth is associated with 
its safety (reduced flammable range), its environmental friendliness, its potential cost 
efficiency (ongoing with technological advances in extraction, transportation and 
distribution) and its relative abundance at proximity to markets and more uniform 
distribution of reserves than oil. 
Natural gas is colourless, odourless and lighter than air. The primary component of natural 
gas is methane (CH4) which usually accounts for 90% of NG. Other components are ethane, 
propane, butanes and pentanes and in less proportions CO,, Helium, Hydrogen Sulphide 
and Nitrogen. Natural gas is not to be confused with "town gas" which was artificially 
produced from the carbonization of coal. 
The most "natural" waj, for transporting NG is through pipelines. However, this cannot be 
feasible for long hauls. Figure 2-1, below, shows the competitiveness of transporting gas by 
pipeline versus LNG carriers depending on capacities of pipelines (width in inches) and 
LNG carrier capacity. 
Under a temperature of 
-161 °C, NG liquefies and becomes LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). 
LNG takes 1 /600th of the volume of Natural Gas and is less than half the weight of water, 
for the same volume. It is non-corrosive and non-toxic and it does not explode in an 
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unconfined environment. LNG is thus preferred in many instances for transportation and 
storage purposes. 
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Natural gas originates in the same way as oil does through chemical reactions occurring on 
organic matter during hundreds of thousands of years underground. It is believed, according 
to Banks (1987), that Natural gas is one step further from oil in the reaction of organic 
matter. This explains why areas abundant in oil reserves are more likely to be also abundant 
in natural gas resources. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to classify natural gas in two types: 
Associated natural gas is that which is extracted as a side product of crude oil exploration. It 
is also called wet-gas. This gas can either be flared (burnt into the atmosphere), reinjected 
into the well to create a "natural" pressure for oil extraction, or marketed. It is important, 
with regard to economics, to note that the supply function in relation to gas price is flat since 
Total, Presentation in the 211ßi Energy Risk Management Seminar, 2004 
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the production is not controllable and is only subject to the oil extraction with which it is 
associated. Non-associated gas, or dry-gas, is that which is extracted from dedicated gas 
ficlds 
2.1 Natural Gas and LNG logistical chain 
Natural gas resembles the crude oil industry in terms of exploration and transportation, and 
electricity in terms of regulation, distribution and interface with the end consumer. 
Logistical stage 
ion Extraction 
Processing 
Transport 
Pipeline LNG 
Compan`ý 
Exploration 
Price 
Storage Distribution 
Domestic & Com. Industrial Electricity 
Well-head 
CIF & 
Pipeline & Tanker 
Pipeline 
companies Price 
LDCs End User's 
Figure 2-2 Use, Prices and Vertical Structure of the Natural Gas Value Chain2 
Figure 2-2 shows the logistical chain for natural gas including prices. Throughout the past 
twenty years, vertical integration of the natural gas market was witnessed, whereby the same 
EIA (2004) 
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companies or alliances (utilities companies) undertake all stages of production and 
distribution of natural gas. Also, there is a move from oil majors to be involved in the 
natural gas exploration and trade (EIA 2004). 
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Figure 2-3 The LNG Logistical Chain and Examples of Corresponding Costs3 
In order to be traded by LNG carriers, natural gas has to be liquefied in special LNG 
liquefaction facilities located in port terminals. Upon offloading at the discharge port, LNG 
is regasified and distributed through pipeline to the grid. Figure 2-3 outlines the logistical 
chain and the typical capital costs of the different parts of the logistical chain. These costs 
vary from project to project. Figure 2-4, below, shows the cost distribution for the LNG 
chain. 
' Total, Presentation in the 2"ßi Energy Risk Management Seminar, 2004 
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ILLUSTRATIVE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE PROFILES FOR 
SELECTED LNG PROJECTS 
ASSUMING TWO 3.3 MM7 TRAINS AND 
A FIELD INVESTMENT OF $3.85/ANNUAL MMBTU 
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Figure 2-4 Cost Distribution of Different LNG Projects, Jensen (2004) 
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The world proved reserves of natural gas have amounted, at the end of 2004, to 180 trillion 
cubic meters, translating to an estimated world R/P ratio' of 67 years. It is important to note 
that this ratio is not constant as both the world's production and proved reserves have been 
increasing at a steady rate since the mid-seventies (Figure 2-5). 
R%P stands for Rcscrv-cs ()\-cr vcarly Production. It is used to yuantirtt the number of years available for a 
depletable commodity, should production remain constant and reserves and no new reserves or technologies 
are discovered 
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World & OECD Reserves in TCM 
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Figure 2-5 Evolution of the World's and OECD's natural gas reserves5 
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Figure 2-6 Comparison between oil and gas regional reserves distributions6 
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Figure 2-7 Comparison between oil and gas national reserves distribution? 
An interesting fact about reserves distribution in gas, if compared with oil, is that it is more 
evenly distributed regionally, as shown by Figure 2-6. Figure 2-7, but it is much less evenly 
BP Statistical Rcvicw of World Energy (2005) 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2005) 
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distributed on the national level as the three largest proven reserves of gas account for 56% 
of world reserves as apposed to oil, 43%. 
2.2.2 Exploration and Production (E&P) 
Figure 2-8 shows the cash flow profile of a natural gas project. It can be seen that such 
projects require long term contract with Take-Or-Pay8 provisions to make them 
economically feasible for the investor wishing to engage in a natural gas project (Banks, 
1987). Before the investment time, all exploration investments are sunk costs. The success of 
the project relies on the "height" (capacity of production) and "length" (field lifetime) of the 
plateau. As outlined in the figure, the lifetime of the field can be increased given investment 
in technology that increases the amount of gas recoverable. 
Plateau 
Rcvcnucs 
cline 
Time 
Costs 
it 
Figure 2-8 Cash flow profile of a natural gas upstream project9 
ToP provisions rcyuire the off-taker of the long term contract to buy a pre-specified percentage of the 
contract nominal quantity, say 80°'o, or else to pay for it 
`) Bank (1987) 
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2.2.3 Elements differentiating suppliers 
Due to many logistical, financial and strategic issues, competitiveness in natural gas is 
different than in oil. This competition is impeded by a number of factors. An important 
issue to consider is the cost of transportation, especially over long hauls (refer to figure 2-1), 
as LNG liquefaction terminals are highly capital intensive. Compared to crude oil, LNG 
carriers are 8 times more expensive to build than crude oil carriers carrying the same amount 
of energy10. This makes CIF" prices of LNG highly sensitive to transportation and 
henceforth to distance. Because of this, the global natural gas market is a quasi-detached one 
with (Atlantic and Pacific markets are separate). 
As with crude oil, the cost of extraction varies from country to country, and indeed from 
field to field. Very little cost of extraction data is available as it is difficult to quantify and, 
when this data is available, it is not usually made public due to its competitive sensitivity. 
Distance between the field and export infrastructure (pipeline or LNG liquefaction) is also a 
major element of consideration, especially in a large country like, for instance, Russia. 
An important issue of consideration remains the reserves amount, production levels, the 
importance of gas to the local economy and the pricing thereof locally as well as the 
importance of gas exports to the country's GDP and foreign currency revenues. 
On the micro-economic dimension, production varies between countries based on upstream 
policies and the relationship between the regulator, the government and the national oil/gas 
company 
-if such company exists. This factor is further amplified by the creditability of the 
national oil/gas company and indeed the credit worthiness of the country itself". 
source: The l'S Department of Energy Energ Information Administration 
" Cost, Insurance and Freight 
- 
the cost of gas just before regasification 
12 Boussena (1994) 
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2.2.4 Main producers 
The US is the world's second largest producer with 543 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) in 2004, 
amounting to 20% of the world's production, against less than 3% in reserves. The R/P ratio 
of the US is one of the lowest in the world: 10 years. Canada who produces 183 BCM has an 
R/P ratio of 9 years. 
Russia is the largest producer with 584 BCM in 2004, with the noticeable difference that it 
has over 80 years of R/P ratio. Other large producers of the Former Soviet Union are 
Uzbekistan with 56 and Turkmenistan with 55 BCM in 2004. 
The EU has a 13 year R/P ratio as it produced 215 BCM in 2004. The European Gas 
production is dominated by the UK with a 45% share, the Netherlands and Norway with 
32% and 37% share, respectively. African production, 145 BCM in 2005, is dominated by 
Algeria that has a 56% share. Egypt, Nigeria and Libya now have 18%, 14% and 5%. of 
African production, respectively. 
The Middle-East, which is the largest regional single producer of oil, only produces 10% of 
the world's gas and therefore has an R/P of 264 years. Iran and Qatar, the two main 
producers of the region, sitting on the world's second and third largest reserves produced 
over 85 BCM and 39 BCM, respectively, in 2004. 
While Asia-Pacific produced 323 BCM in 2004, to which Indonesia contributed 64 BCM, 
South America has only produced 129 BCM, to which Argentina and Venezuela contributed 
37 and 27 BCM. 
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2.2.5 Main exporters 
2.2.5.1 By Pipeline 
Due to the more even distribution of reserves of gas if compared to oil, on a regional level, a 
small proportion only of natural gas is traded, most of which through pipelines, as Figure 2-9 
shows. 
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Figure 2-9 Comparison of proportion of gas and oil traded vs. produced 
With exports of over 148 BCM in 2004 to most West-European countries (principally 
France, German- and Italy), Russia is the world's largest exporter of Natural Gas by pipeline. 
Canada is the world's second largest exporter of natural gas by pipeline as it exported over 
102 BCM in 2004 to the US. Canada is advantaged as it is the only country with high enough 
production rates and economically feasible distances from the US, the world's largest market. 
It is worthwhile noting that Canada also imported 1.78 BCM from the US in 2004. 
In Europe, Norway and the Netherlands head the list by supplying, respectively, 49 and 75 
BCM of natural gas by pipeline in 2004. Algeria is the world's 5" largest supplier of Natural 
Gas by pipeline with 35 BCM1 exported in 2005 principally to Italy and Spain through the 
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Pedro Durran Farrell and the Enrico Mattei pipelines. Table 2-1 shows the most important 
pipeline trade routes in 2004. 
From To Amount (2004, in BCV 
Canada US 102 
Russia Germany 38 
Norway Germany 26 
Algeria Italy 24 
Netherlands Germany 22 
Russia Italy 21 
Russia Turkey 14 
Table 2-1 Main pipeline trade routes in 2004 
2.2.5.2 By LNG 
A broader discussion about LNG trade is in section 2.6.1 of this chapter. 
2.3 Demand side 
2.3.1 Use of natural gas, determinants and substitutes 
2.3.7.7 Residential use 
The operating costs of residential equipment using natural gas are usually lower than those 
using other primary energy sources. Consequently, natural gas is used in different 
applications at home, amongst them, cooking and heating. 
Residential consumption of Natural Gas is largely affected by weather. In cold weather, 
consumption of Natural Gas increases for heating uses. In hot weather, demand for natural 
gas increases through the increase of demand in electricity for cooling (air conditioning). 
This illustrates the seasonal nature of natural gas demand. Other commercial and residential 
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applications of natural gas and electricity are usually dependant on income and population. It 
is expected that a so-called "summer peak" will form in gas pricing, as a result of increased 
usage of gas either directly, or through electricity consumption, driven the usage or air 
conditioning equipment, particularly in hotter countries. 
Natural gas is usually substituted for electricity for both heating and cooking. Refined crude 
oil (fuel oil) is also used for heating and, in some countries, coal and wood are still used for 
domestic energy consumption. 
An important issue for consideration for a geography-bound infrastructurally-constrained 
industry like natural gas is the differentiation between demand and consumption. In an 
infrastructure poor area, there could be demand that does not materialize into consumption. 
There is therefore econometric evidence suggesting a granger-causality relationship between 
new capacity and consumption13 
2.3.1.2 Commercial 
Natural gas is also used in the hotel, office building and healthcare industries for cooling and 
heating. The determinants of such demand are similar to those mentioned in the previous 
section of residential uses. 
2.3.1.3 Industrial 
"Natural gas is used as an input to manufacture pulp and paper, metals, chemicals, stone, 
clay, glass, and to process certain foods. Gas is also used to treat waste materials, for 
incineration, drying, dehumidification, heating and cooling, and cogeneration. i14 The 
demand for natural gas also increases with the demand of end products (pulp, paper, 
metals 
... 
etc), in which NG enters as an input. 
13 Hallouche & Tamvakis, Presentation at the Second Energy Risk Management Seminar (2004) 
14 ',, uurcc: UNCTAD 
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2.3.1.4 Power generation 
An increasing number of electric utilities use natural gas as it enables them to have (i) a lower 
cost of capital, (ii) faster set up, (iii) a more efficient production and (vi) less pollution in 
emissions. Increase for demand in Electricity, usually provoked by higher economic welfare 
or higher industrial activity, increases demand for natural gas. Power generation 
consumption is characterised by step-changes due to the entry in operation of gas-powered 
generators. Chapter 4 in this thesis shall discuss this further. 
Natural gas competes with coal and nuclear energy in the power generation sector. The 
former has been constrained due to its polluting nature but with the emergence of new clean 
coal power generation technologies, it is deemed to continue to play an important role in the 
power generation sector. In the face of security of supply, reduced cost and environmental 
friendliness, nuclear is being more actively considered by policy makers, but is facing political 
hostility in some countries, due to the potentially hazardous and dangerous fuel, production 
and wastes disposal processes. 
2.3.1.5 Transportation 
The usage of natural gas for transportation only represents a minute proportion as oil 
accounts for almost the totality of primary energy consumed in this sector. However there 
are available technologies. According to the International Natural Gas Vehicles (NGV) 
Association, the world's fleet for Natural Gas Vehicles accounts for half a million cars and 
increasing. This is due to the rising environmental concerns and the efficiency of natural gas 
as a fuel. Natural gas is also used as input for Gas-to-Liquid which has similar properties to 
refined crude oil products. There has been strong interest for GTL in some producing 
countries like Qatar and Algcria. 
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2.3.2 Tastes and Primary Energy Consumption Mixes 
Different countries have different tastes in terms of their primary energy mix. The mix 
largely depends on their national resources endowment and their ability to import fuels from 
neighboring countries, which proxies the cost. It also reflects their national policy in terms of 
environment and market liberalization. Further, oil consumption is usually higher with high 
usage of transportation which is usually an attribute of countries with low population density 
(more transportation needed). 
China 
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Figure 2-10 Primary Energy Mix for the EU, Russia, China, Japan and the US 
-200415 
As Figure 2-10 shows, a country like Russia, which is abundant in gas obtains more than half 
its energy from this fuel, whereas China, which is favourably endowed in coal, obtains only 
3`% of its energy from gas 
- 
as it competes quasi-directly with coal. Other regions have 
similar mix patterns. 
2.3.3 Main consumers 
As the US is both one of the world's largest producers of NG and yet the world's largest 
importer, it is therefore the world's largest consumer. Indeed, the US consumes more than 
27% of the gas produced worldwide. Canada is the second consumer in the Americas with 
90 BCM in 2004. 
Russia and Ukraine are the largest consumers in the Former Soviet Union with 402 and 71 
BCM in 2004, respectively. The other Asian major consumers are Japan and Iran with 72 
and 87 BCN1 consumed in 2004. The UK heads the European natural gas consumption list 
with 92 BCM in 2004 followed by Germany with 86 and Italy with 73 BCM. 
1' BP Statistical Rcvicw of World Encrty (2004) 
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2.3.4 Main importers 
2.3.4.1 By pipeline 
The US is the world's largest importer of natural gas by pipeline. Their principal supplier in 
this category is Canada. Germany imported in 2004 92 BCM by pipeline principally from 
Russia, Norway and the Netherlands. The third importer by pipeline is Italy with 61 BCM in 
2004 supplied mainly by Russia and Algeria. 
2.3.4.2 By LNG 
A broader discussion about LNG trade is in section 2.6 of this chapter. 
2.4 Industry and Regulation 
2.4.1 Policy 
2.4.7.7 Deregulation 
Being considered as a strategic commodity, the natural gas industry 
-as indeed many other 
energy commodities- has always been controlled by the state and not by market forces. 
There have been trends in the past years, both by developed and developing countries, for a 
move towards market liberalisation of the natural gas industry. 
In effect, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 in the US has totally deregulated the market in 
that country. Further, in 1992, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required pipeline 
companies to unbundle their transportation, sales and storage 16 
16 EIA (2004) 
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The EU on the other hand is still behind the US in terms of deregulation. The first and 
second gas directives are in the process of being implemented (more details on the 
regulatory framework of the European Union in chapter 3). Deregulation and market 
liberalization are also gradually being implemented in Korea and Japan, who are major LNG 
importers. 
2.4.1.2 Security of supply 
As mentioned above, security of supply's importance in energy policy has been growing 
particularly in the EU with the publication of the so-called Green Paper on Energy by the 
EU Commission and the Natural Gas Security of Supply Directive which calls upon 
Member States to have contingency plans for their natural gas procurements through the 
usage of storage and the diversification of partners. For example, it is a legal requirement in 
Spain that no single supplier can account for more than 60% of the Spanish market. 
2.4.1.3 Environment 
Natural gas is always favoured as a means of diversifying energy resources because of its 
cleaner emissions. Several regional or international agreements and organizations my to 
promote this. The Kyoto protocol, which has just come into force, provides that signatories 
reduce their carbon emissions so as to reach an agreed-upon level. These changes are 
implemented on the micro-level as companies are now able to purchase allowances for 
carbon and trade them on the EU Emission Trading Scheme. The Energy Charter and the 
Energy- Services treatment with the WTO are also some other important international energy 
related treaties. 
2.4.2 Downstream industry structure 
As discussed abovc, currently, there is a trend to moving from a monopolistic natural gas 
market towards the deregulation of it. Natural gas exploration, transport and distribution 
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suffer, at their infant stage, high marginal costs due to high capital expenditure and technical 
risk. However, as projects progress towards maturity, capital outlays are depreciated and 
technical risks are lower. The IEA (2004) has identified the following steps of market 
deregulation: 
2.4.2.1 Pipeline-to pipeline competition 
That is the environment emerging from the competition between two or more pipeline 
companies for the local market. Although supplies are usually organized in long term 
contracts, the threat of the construction of a new pipeline will impose competitive pressures 
on the current suppliers and would naturally regulate the prices. 
2.4.2.2 Whole Tale or bulk market competition 
In this step of deregulation, non-discriminatory third party access to the high-pressure 
transmission system is mandatory and transportation services are unbundled. 
2.4.2.3 Full retail competition 
Mandatory third-party access is expanded to cover distribution networks and high-pressure 
transmission system. All gas price controls are removed. 
2.5 Markets 
2.5.1 Pricing 
The lack of uniformity in the world's natural gas pricing is due to the presence of several 
sub-markets, segmented regionally and nationally. Also it is due to the regulatory framework 
imposed both on natural gas exploration, transport and distribution. The lack of 
transparency resulting therefrom, and to the long-term nature of natural gas contracts, both 
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at the exploration and distribution levels are also factors affecting the pricing of natural gas. 
Logistically, it is also due to the fact that NG is difficult to transport and store, which 
reduces significantly the scope for arbitrage between sub-markets. 
In the US, a fairly liberalized gas market, the end-user price of natural gas (i. e. the price to 
the end consumer) was broken down as in Figure 2-11. It can be seen that the price depends 
more on distribution expenses, then on the well-head price and finally on transportation 
prices. Figure 2-12 shows the differences between prices charged for different needs (e. g. 
commercial, industrial, domestic or power generation). 
NG end-consumer price structure 
-1 
o Well-head 
" Distribution 
o Transport 
Figure 2-11 End user price decomposition in the US in 200417 
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A more specific discussion on natural gas pricing on the international trade level is available 
in chapter 3 with special focus on the studied markets. 
2.5.2 Contracts & Spot trade 
Traditionally, natural gas contracts were long-term contracts between integrated natural gas 
companies and users, with fixed prices, reduced supply and price risks and little flexibility. 
The principle around which contracts were agreed was that "the supplier takes the volume 
risk and the buyer the price risk". In the US, Canada and the UK, the importance of these 
contracts has been reduced as a result of liberalization of the industry, while spot markets 
have increased their presence. 
Spot markets allow for greater flexibility to balance supply and demand in order to react to 
changing market conditions. Participants in the natural gas markets can then form a 
portfolio of long and short-term contracts. However, most of the gas that is internationally 
traded is under long-term contracts. 
Spot markets are generally created in areas with concentration of buyers and sellers such as 
pipeline interconnections located close to large consuming regions, or major terminals of gas 
producing countries. Spot prices are then set at various locations. Main references for spot 
prices in North America are: New York City Gate, Henry Hub Louisiana, Chicago City 
Gate, Katv Hub Texas, So. Calif. Border or AECO Hub (Canada). 
Data concerning the terms of the long terms contracts between countries, quantities sold 
and prices 
-and pricing structures- agreed upon are almost impossible to obtain officially, 
'l E1: ß (2004) 
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due to confidentiality. More details on the European Natural Gas Long Term Contacts can 
be found in chapter 3. 
2.5.3 Derivative or paper markets 
When there is an actively traded spot market, price volatility, a mature pipeline infrastructure 
and possibilities for storage, there emerges the potential for a derivatives market. Below are 
examples of derivatives natural gas markets. 
- 
Henry Hub (in Nymex): Nymex launched the world's first natural gas futures 
contract in April 1990. Options on natural gas futures were launched in October 
1992. 
- 
IPE (now renamed ICE) Gas Contract is traded in the London International 
Petroleum Exchange, for delivery to the National Balancing Point (NBP) 
- 
The Inter-continental exchange: The Intercontinental Exchange is an Internet-based 
marketplace for the trading of over-the-counter energy. It represents the partnership 
of world leading financial institutions with some of the world's largest diversified 
energy and natural resource firms. 
- 
The natural gas exchange: NGX, located in Calgary, Canada, provides electronic 
trading and clearing services to natural gas buyers and sellers in Alberta, one of the 
largest and most significant production areas of natural gas in North America. Since 
its inception in 1995, NGX has grown to serve over 120 customers with trading 
activity averaging 200 BCF (211 000 TJ) per month 
- 
Altra Market place: Formerly known as AltradeTM, it offers real-time online 
electronic trading for energy commodities where traders actively -, -iew and exchange 
bids and offers quickly and anonymously. It is accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a 
\wwcck. 
- 
Kansas City Board of trade Gas Contract 
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The rationale behind Long Term Contracts, as illustrated by Neuhoff & von Hirchhausen 
(2005), outlines three schools of thoughts: The institutional economics literature interprets 
them as a tool to avoid opportunistic risk taking in high sunk cost investment industries, 
advocated by Klein et al (1987), Williamson (1985) and others; The industrial organisation 
theory, which looks at the strategic value of long term contracts, advocated by Parsons 
(1989) and others; The infrastructure investment literature, advocated by Oren (2003), which 
looks at the risk sharing along the logistical chain and how this risk balance can be disturbed 
under a scenario of supply chain desaggregation. 
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2.6 Discussion around the World's LNG market 
Trade flows worldwide (billion cubic metres) 
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Figure 2-13 Snapshot of natural gas and LNG trade flows around the world 
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200419 
As mentioned before, only a small proportion of natural gas is traded, and only a small 
proportion of that is traded as LNG. As consumption has been growing, domestic 
production in consuming markets declining, and pipeline opportunities are limited, LNG 
trade has been growing fast. 
I') Source: BP Statistical Rcv-ic\-, " of World Energy 
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Pictures of LNG export and import terminals are available in Appendix 2. 
Figure 2-13 shows that the pipeline market is local and the LNG market sub-regional. Two 
almost distinct markets, the Atlantic and the Pacific, can be distinguished. As mentioned 
above (Figure 2-9) due to its cost implications, natural gas is not as actively traded as oil. 
An important development in the Atlantic market has been the continued emergence of the 
US as an increasingly important LNG importer, which is likely to have a profound effect on 
the Atlantic LNG market. 
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Canada Export Potential 
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Figure 2-14 Import and Export potential for the US and Canada 
- 
the widening gap (figured in BCM)20 
The graphs in Figure 2-14 show that US production is stabilising and consumption growing 
and that the export potential of Canada by pipeline is becoming limited. Unless there is a 
decline in consumption or an increase in production, LNG imports to the US are likely to 
rise. In the meantime, the US has been the strongest driver of short-term LNG trade in 2004 
from the suppliers highlighted in Figure 2-15. Although most of them are from the "Atlantic 
Market", some of them are also players from the pacific market (like Australia and Malaysia). 
1, ' BP Statistical Rc,, 
-icvv- of World Encrm- (2004) 
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Figure 2-15 LNG exporters to the US in 200421 
The US has one export terminal in Alaska that supplies Japan. It also has 4 LNG import 
terminals. Due to institutional changes in the 1980s, these terminals were shut down as LNG 
lost its competitiveness`I. The new emergence of the US market has made LNG attractive 
again and as figure 2-18 shows, there is a number of LNG regasification plants proposed, 
planned or under construction in both the East Coast (Atlantic market) and the west coast 
(Pacific market). Not all of them will eventually be built, but the US is nonetheless expected 
to become an important LNG market player. It is worth noting that the LNG terminal 
construction has faced fierce opposition by local groups amid fears of safety. The so-called 
NINIBY (Not In My BackYard) attitude is representing an important impediment to 
regasification terminals procedures. 
BP Statistical Rcv-lcvv- of World Enemy (2004) 
=' Ali Hachcd, Vicc President of Sonatrach discussion, Port of Spain, 2005 
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There are also talks of off-shore regasification terminals as well as the so-called 
"regasification sub-contracting" that involves buying pipeline gas from other countries who 
buy LNG (potential examples are Mexico, Puerto Rico and Jamaica). 
There is also a large amount of new capacity in Africa. After the explosion of the Skikda 
terminal in Algeria in January 2004, fresh investment in that terminal are being made and 
23 Gas Strategics Online (2005) 
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more capacity is expected. New terminals are expected both in Egypt (who has delivered its 
first LNG in 2005), Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola. Refer to Figure 2-17. 
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Figure 2-17 LNG Projects in Africa24 
Spain has also been a major driver of LNG trade. France is one of the largest LNG 
importers in Europe and Italy has been proactive in building terminals and concluding LNG 
long-term contracts'5. The UK has received its first LNG delivery for 40 years in 2005 in the 
new Isle of Grain terminal and Belgium, Portugal, Greece and Turkey continue to be buyers 
24 Gas Stratcgics Online (2005) 
-'' 
1\Iorc information about France, Italy and Spain LNG in chapter 3 
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in the LNG market (Figure 2-18). Europe will also see its first liquefaction terminal in 
Norway which is due to operate in 2007. 
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The Middle East is home to one of the world's largest single reservoirs of natural gas (the 
North Field in Qatar of the South Pars Field in Iran). A large amount of investment is going 
to liquefaction, and by-products, infrastructure in Qatar, the UAE and Oman who are taking 
market share in the European market and also the Pacific market. 
" Gas Strategies Online (2005) 
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The Pacific Market is different from the Atlantic one in that there is very little pipeline trade. 
Most of the gas traded is in LNG, most of it in Long Term Contracts and most of it indexed 
to a cocktail of Crude Oil blends Qapanese Crude Cocktail). 
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'- Gas Strategics Online (2005) 
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Figure 2-20 LNG Projects in Asia-Pacific28 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Australia are the region's major suppliers though new ones, 
such as Peru and Russia (the Shakhalin Project), are expected to start trading soon. Japan 
and Korea are the most important buyers with the latter being the world's largest importer 
of LNG in the world. 
's Gas Stratcgics Onlinc (2005) 
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Figure 2-21 LNG Projects in Japan29 
Duc to its seismic attributes, Japan cannot have a complex internal pipeline structure; its 
utilities have therefore invested in a number of regasification terminals (the largest one in the 
world) in its major consumption hubs. 
'0 G: is Strategics Online (2005) 
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30 BP Statistical Rcv-icýw- of World Energy (2005) 
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Figure 2-22 and Figure 2-23 give an overview of the Pacific market as Japan and Korea are 
the most important buyers. Figure 2-26, below, highlights the growth in consumption for 
Japan and Korea. 
r 
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Figure 2-24 Japanese and Korean Natural Gas consumption series32 
2.6.1 Outlook for LNG in the future 
The natural gas international market is going through a profound change, in capacity, trade 
patterns and profile of the players. The Long Term Contract structure is expected to remain 
at least for the medium-term. Spot and short term is expected to grow but is not expected to 
represent more than 25% (Stern 2002). The pipeline market will not grow at the same pace 
as LNG. More flexibility is expected to the LTCs and more trading, arbitrage and swaps will 
take place. 
BP Statistical Rev-1e w" of World Energy (2005) 
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Changes in the LNG market depend on many factors: the way financial institutions invest in 
LNG projects, the involvement of high credit rating oil majors, the maturity of the 
international infrastructure 
-liquefaction, regasification and shipping, and the internal market 
structure in the consuming countries and the legal upstream structure in the producing 
countries. It is believed that the number of players both on the selling and buying sides will 
grow fast and the development of an active US market is pushing for the Atlantic market to 
become more liquid (Jensen 2004). 
An ongoing research by Hallouche & Tamvakis (2005)33 has shown that a more active short 
term and spot market will be formed through the vertical hedge and the geographical 
expansion of both national gas companies like Sonatrach and Petronas, former incumbents 
in high consumption gas markets, such as BG, GDF and Repsol and Oil majors. In projects 
where a company, a consortium, or an alliance, controls a large proportion of the middle- 
stream supply chain (and sometimes upstream and downstream 
-so called ex-terminal), long 
term contracts are no longer required as the vertical hedge secures contracts: companies do 
not have to have long term contracts with themselves. 
Also, opportunities of arbitrage are much higher if companies have a horizontal hedge. BG, 
which has a presence both in Egypt and Trinidad & Tobago can take benefit of US/Europe 
price differentials. 
More importantly, larger companies and alliances can attract capital at lower cost and can 
offer balance-sheet securities for bankers who, in return, would accept offtake contracts with 
more flexibility, if so required. Larger companies can also reduce the level of gearing in 
project-financed projects. Further, they can also invest in LNG carriers not committed to a 
long term time charter. 
33 ', Spot Trade will Claim Increasingly Important Role', Argus Global LNG, July 2005 quoting Hallouche & 
Tamvakis (2005) 
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This liquidity will be pushed further as a large volume of contracted imports will come to 
expiration soon. In the light of recent developments with the destination clause and price 
indexation clauses, especially in the EU, these contracts are likely to be more flexible. Also, 
for amortized infrastructure, where new capital costs are significantly lower, new contracts 
will not need the long term structure. 
Though it is widely accepted that long term contracts will remain, at least in the medium 
term, sport and shorter term trade will very likely represent and growing part of the trade. 
With these expected changes in mind, chapter 3 will discuss with more details the EU 
market and more particularly France, Italy and Spain; the countries under study from the 
economic, infrastructural and regulatory perspectives. 
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3. Overview of the European Natural Gas Market 
This chapter will discuss the economics and regulatory aspects of the European gas market 
as well as provide a more comprehensive overview of the French, Italian and Spanish 
markets. This chapter will also discuss ongoing debate on security of supply vs market 
liberalisation. 
3.1 The legal framework of the European gas market 
Europe has been undergoing over the past few years important changes to its energy market 
structure, especially with regards to natural gas deregulation. Natural gas, which now 
accounts for roughly one fifth of primary energy consumption there, is expected to gain 
considerable market share in the future and efforts are being made to create the appropriate 
legal and financial environment to cater for this. At the same time, there are environmental 
concerns amid growing carbon emissions and there are also significant security-of-supply 
and dependence concerns. This should be added to market uncertainty provoked by recent 
international political and military unrest and major energy related company failures. 
The natural gas industry- in Europe was generally dominated by state-owned/operated 
monopolies, with the exception of the UK. These companies usually operated in the import, 
processing, transmission and distribution of natural gas to the final customer of their 
respective countries. End user prices are usually based on competition from other fuels and 
import prices are usually calculated using formulae with a base price and a differential to 
crude oil prices or, but much less frequently, coal prices. A cost-plus approach is also 
sometimes used. 
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As of now, Europe depends on the rest of the world for 50% of its energy needs and this is 
expected to increase to 70% by 203034 as the European resources will move towards 
depletion and new or renewable energy will probably be too costly to gain a noteworthy 
market share. The cost of production of coal in Europe is on average 4-5 times the world 
market price and that of oil is 2-7 times the world market price. The reserves of natural gas 
are 2% of the world reserves with an R/P ratio of 20 years. Nuclear technology cannot 
expand without collegial political will and some solution to the problem of waste. 35 
It is with these issues in mind that the Energy Green Paper was thought in November 2000 
and debate of which was concluded in the Barcelona Summit in March 200236 
3.1.1 The Green Paper for Energy 
The Energy Green Paper is an unprecedented `comprehensive thorough-going discussion' 
for Europe's energy future and how it should fit with the other economic and environmental 
strategies of the European Union. It aims to tackle the issue of security of supply as stated 
above. Also, it aims to look at the internal energy market, uncertainties of oil prices and 
environmental challenges. 
The Green paper discusses the reduction of coal consumption due to its environmental 
impact, looking for substitution for oil especially in the transportation sector. Also, it 
highlights the dependence of the EU for 90% of its oil and long-term contracts on countries 
perceived as politically unstable. The Paper also stipulates that investments and tax 
incentives should be given for the promotion of the production of renewable energy with 
view of increasing its market share to 12% by 2010. 
34 Source: The EU Encrg v Green Paper 
35 Source: EuroGas 2000 Annual Report 
36 Sourcc: EU \\'cbsite http: //europa. cu. int 
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Further, the Paper also addresses the issue of greenhouse emissions and recommends that 
the Union reduce its greenhouse gases by 8% to their 1990 level in the same spirit as the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Paper also addresses the issues of taxation and transparency of state 
aid. It further discusses the opening of internal markets of gas and electricity to commercial 
competition which is also further dealt with by the 1998 Gas Directive. 
3.1.2 The Gas Directives 
The aim of the EU Gas Directive of 199837 was to liberalise European gas markets by 
providing for non discriminatory access to gas infrastructure, the accounts unbundling of 
monopoly activities and the publication of a market opening timetable spanning from large 
natural gas consumers (such as power plants and large industrial consumers) to domestic 
consumers. The Gas Directive also called for a dispute settlement authority. 
Upon debate by national parliaments and application by some countries, this is` Gas 
Directive was increasingly seen not to be effective enough to push the process forward. The 
Second Gas Directive of 200331 came to address the weaknesses of the 1S` Gas Directive and 
provided for a regulated third party access to be mandatory (apart from storage). This means 
that non-incumbent operators should have access to national infrastructure on the same 
basis as former legal monopolies. The accounting unbundling called for by the 1 S` Gas 
Directive is now required to be legal unbundling. This means that vertically integrated 
companies (who would own the local distribution infrastructure) would be separated to a 
number of legal entities. The opening timetable was brought forward and an independent 
regulator in each country was called for. The regulator's duties are to manage and allocate 
interconnection capacity (cross-border capacity), to effectively unbundle accounts of the 
37 Et' 98/30/E(: 
38 Ft' 2003/55/EC 
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incumbent to avoid cross subsidies, to ensure a level of transparency and competition, as 
well as publish appropriate data and information. 
The directive also calls on the commission to report on the progress of the implementation 
of the directive annually. 
Figure 3-1 Comparative degree of implementation of the gas directive (using the Gas Strategies 
Index)39 
Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 show the progress on liberalization achieved by 
selected Member States. As it can be observed, there is a wide-ranging spectrum of "degrees 
of liberalization", with a reasonable correlation between Gas Directive key indicators and 
market share of non-incumbents. The UK, which is a special case as it has liberalized its 
market well before the EU Gas Directives, heads both tables. Spain and Italy, who have 
implemented some aspects of the directive ahead of schedule, are in the top of the key 
indicator table. Italy lags in the market share of non-incumbents. France, who has shown 
This index was dcvclopcd by Gas Strategics, a London-based consulting firm, that includes timetables o>t 
implementation, regulator, TPA and other indicators; as presented at the 2"ßi Energy Risk Management 
Seminar, Cass Business School, 2004 
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reluctance in applying the directive previously, has made progress but is still at the bottom of 
the table from the key indicators perspective. 
The directive has faced, and is facing, many hurdles in its implementation; however progress 
has been made according to many market observers. As chapter 4 discusses, there is still very 
little evidence for price competitiveness with large consumers, but discussions with 
representatives of market players showed that such competitiveness is starting to emerge in 
the medium term. 
Figure 3-2 Degree of liberalization in terms of the market share of non-incumbant companies, 
developed by Gas Strategies40 
Pressure by competition in home markets has also prompted incumbents to look at 
international markets. Indeed the level of both vertical (e. g. up the LNG chain) and 
horizontal (or geographical) expansions has increased tremendously since the first gas 
directive was adopted. 
"' As abovc 
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Figure 3-3 Degree of liberalization according to key indicators and market share of non-incumbents, 
developed by Gas Strategies 
Another important regulation introduced by DG COMP (Directorate General for 
Competition) of the EU Commission. These rules (generated some controversy, both with 
Member States and producers) and discussed in Nyssens & Osborne (2005) and Nyssens et 
al (2004), have made destination clauses in long term contracts illegal, and have introduced 
restrictions to joint-bidding, joint sales and profit sharing agreements. 
3.1.3 The Energy Charter 
At a suggestion by the Prime Minister of the Netherlands at the meeting of the European 
Council in Dublin in June 1990, the commission proposed the concept of the Energtiy 
(: harter in 1991. The Energy Charter was meant to promote `east-west' industrial 
cooperation and provide a legal framework for investment, transit and trade of energy as 
well as promote environmental awareness and dispute settlement. The European 
Community as well as some other countries are signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The Energy Charter Treaty uses the same rules as the GATT and later WTO and Members 
of the treaty that are not members of the GATT/WTO must apply these trade laws. 
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Meeting the Directive and the Green paper, above, the Charter also promotes the opening of 
internal markets, the deregulation of them and the promotion of healthy competition. On 
the environmental side, the treaty incorporates the `polluter pays' principle. As for the 
Directive, countries with economies in transition are offered transitional preferences. 
3.1.4 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol came pursuant to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The Kyoto protocol is designed to tackle the effect of greenhouse by 
calling on countries to reduce their carbon emissions. It also aims to promote energy 
efficiency, research and development in renewable energy, the `progressive reduction or 
phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and 
subsidies' in greenhouse gas emitting sectors. 
In practical terms, Parties to the protocol (of which the EU) must ensure (with a certain 
amount of flexibility) that their greenhouse emission do not exceed an amount calculated for 
each country on a case-by-case basis and in consideration with their commitments. 
Some observers argue that while the protocol maybe beneficial for western countries; it may 
encourage some industries to delocalise to developing countries, which are not signatories to 
the protocol. The protocol has entered into force in 2004 upon ratification by Russia, in 
spite of the fact that the US failed to ratify it and is therefore not part of it. The EU 
Emission Trading Scheme has been launched, which would allow companies to trade credits 
for emissions, so as to meet Kyoto requirements. 
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3.2 Overview of the French natural gas market 
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France is Europe's most important importer of LNG. Its main sources of supply are Algeria 
and Nigeria. On the pipeline gas, France imports from Norway and Russia. France has the 
particularity of using less gas than the world's average, because it is poorly endowed with it 
and, because about 75% of its power generation is nuclear, though natural gas consumption 
in other sectors is in line with regional averages, refer to Figure 3-5. 
France Primary Energy Consumption Mix (2004) 
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Figure 3-5 France's primary energy consumption mix (2004) 
Gaz de France was the incumbent gas utility and state-owned legal monopoly for 
production, distribution, transportation and importation of natural gas to the country. In 
view of the EU Gas Directive, GdF has started an important geographical expansion 
reaching, at the time of writing, over 15 million customers outside France. 42 In the same 
fashion as other countries in the EU, the French gas industry landscape has been undergoing 
changes. GdF's is being opened to foreign investors, though at least 50% would remain 
owned by the French State (this will/can change depending on the progress of the merger 
with Suez). The new status of the company also entails that GdF does not enjoy the State's 
guarantee for debt. 
42 E1. ß Francs Factshcct (2005) 
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In view of liberalizing the transport system of natural gas, distribution companies are 
expected to be able to purchase stakes in the parts of the system that they utilize, according 
to the EIA (2005). 
Total is the other important gas player in France. Total's strategy was to concentrate to the 
south of France region where gas prices are higher, as lower cost gas comes through pipeline 
from the north. Total is also planning to construct a new natural gas import pipeline from 
Spain, Euskadour, which connects the Bilbao regasification terminal in Spain to its market in 
Spain. It is bidding for a stake in the Medgaz project, that is expected to procure Spain, and 
subsequently France with natural gas. 
In terms of internal market, GdF operates most of the French pipeline system with over 
(19,000 miles of natural gas pipelines 
- 
with a capacity 5.9 Bcf/d). Refer to Figure 3-4 for 
natural gas entry points. GdF also owns a reported 0.28 Bcf of natural gas storage facilities. 
Refer to the table below for all procurement routes to France and their respective capacities. 
France currently has two LNG receiving terminals: Fos-sur-Mer, on its Mediterranean coast, 
and Montoir-de-Bretagne, on the Atlantic coast. GdF is constructing a new, offshore LNG 
receiving terminal at Fos Cavaou, and ExxonMobil has also proposed building an LNG 
import terminal near Fos Cavaou by 2009, according to the EIA (no further data has been 
obtained with regards to this terminal, it is hence not in the data presented in chapter 7). 
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France Gas Consumption (in BCM) 
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Figure 3-6 French gas consumption43 
On the macro level, France's gas consumption has been steadily increasing with some 
cyclicalities (Figure 3-6). Chapter 4 will discuss this further. From the procurement 
viewpoint, France imports most of its gas by pipeline (Figure 3-7) and has a diversified 
portfolio of pipeline (Figure 3-8) and LNG (Figure 3-9) suppliers in actual as well as from 
the contractual side (Table 3-1). 
CONTRACTS TO 
FRANCE Bcm/year 
2003 
Nor\vav to France 
Norway to France 
Russia to France 
Russia to France 
Algeria to France (Fos) LNG 
Algeria to France (Montoire) LNG 
Nigeria to France (NTontoire) LNG 
 BP Statistical Rcv-icww- of World Energy 
10 
5.5 
8 
Unknown 
5.68 
4.56 
0.51 
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Netherlands to Francc 
UK to France 
France to Spain 
Luxembourg to France 
Table 3-1 Long term contracts to France44 
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Figure 3-7 French gas procurement sources in 200445 
4' Gas Strategics Onlinc (2005) 
4ý BP Statistical Re vicww" of World Energy (2005) 
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Figure 3-9 French LNG partners47 
The White Paper published by the French government in 2003 and the national debate that 
was triggered suggest that, in view- of security of supply considerations, cost and greenhouse 
4(' BP Statistical Rcý-icýw- of World Energy (2005) 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2005) 
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emissions compliance, nuclear would continue to play an increasing important role in 
electricity generation, potentially at the expense of natural gas. 
Global Business Insights (2005), suggest that due to the lack of interconnectivity with other 
European countries (note projects highlighted above) and the current state of the market, 
France could develop to a two-tier market: a northern one with Norway as its main supplier 
and a southern one supplied by interconnections from Spain and Italy. The separation of the 
north and south French market could mean the separation between the North and South 
European markets. 
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3.3 Overview of the Italian natural gas market 
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According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, Italy is the fourth-largest gas 
reserves in the EU. However, its production is in decline, as can be observed from Figure 
3-11. Italy's consumption has been pushed by a series of investments in CCGT (Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbine) power stations. Italy's requirements in natural gas imports are therefore 
growing. 
Eni is probably the most important player in energy markets in Italy as it controls most of 
the gas production. Snam Rete Gas S. p. A. (Snam), a subsidiary thereof 
-though ownership 
of Eni is due to decrease from 50% to 20% by 2007-, owns and operates the internal natural 
gas transportation system, over 19000 miles of pipelines with a capacity of 432 BCF. 
Stoccaggi Gas Italia S. p. A. (Stogit), another subsidiary of ENI, manages most of the natural 
gas storage facilities in the country. Finally, Italgas, also a subsidiary, controls one quarter of 
the retail gas distribution market. 
As Italy's compliance with the Gas Directive was consistent, Eni's dominance of the market 
has been declining, effectively losing more than 30% of its market share to date. Two players 
have been gaining that share of the market. Edison, owned by Fiat and Electricite de France, 
and Enel, the Italian electricity utility. 
One of the important procurement sources of natural gas to Italy is the Transmed (or Enrico 
Mattei) 670-mile pipeline, o exports Algerian Transmed-transported gas to Slovenia. In 2004, 
the 370-mile Greenstream pipeline, from Lfrom Algeria, through Tunisia, which now has a 
capacity of 2.3 Bcf. Other important pipelines are the Trans-European Pipeline (TENP) and 
the Transitgas (from the Netherlands and Norway). Italy also imports natural gas from 
Russia through Austria and Slovenia. Italy alsibya was inaugurated. The Galsi project is a 
direct planned pipeline from Algeria to Sardinia. Enel and Sonatrach (the Algerian national 
oil/gas company) are in advanced stages of this project. 
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Though Italy only operates one LNG regasification terminal, there are several projects being 
planned, for instance the Brindisi terminal by British Gas and Enel which is due to start 
operating within the next few years (with gas coming from Egypt). ExxonMobil and Qatar 
Petroleum, together with Edison, are also building a terminal in the northern coast of Italy 
(with gas coming from Qatar). There are also a number of proposed terminals as per 
Figure 3-10. 
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Production, Consumption and Reserves of Gas in Italy 
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Figure 3-11 Gas production, consumption and reserves for Italy49 
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On the macro level, Italy is a comparatively important gas consumer in terms of primary 
energy mix (Figure 3-12). Due to its more important 
-relatively- reserves profile, it is able to 
maintain a more balanced portfolio of pipeline, growing LNG imports and domestic 
production (Figure 3-13). In terms of suppliers, Italy enjoys the most diversified portfolio 
for pipelines one of the most diversified ones for contracted gas in the region (Figure 3-14, 
Figure 3-15 and Table 3-2). 
Italy Primary Energy Consumption Mix (2004) 
9% 0% 6% 
36% 
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Figure 3-12 Italy's primary energy mix5° 
49 BP Statistical Rc-, vic,, ww of World Energy (2005) 
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Italy Gas Procurement 
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Figure 3-13 Italy gas procurement sources" 
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Figure 3-14 Italy's pipeline partners52 
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Italy LNG Partners 
- 
2004 
Figure 3-15 Italy's LNG partners53 
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Table 3-2 Contracted gas to Italy54 
BP Statistical Rcv-icvv of World Encrg y (2005) 
54 Gas Strategics Online (2005) 
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3.4 Overview of the Spanish natural gas market 
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Figure 3-16 Natural gas map of Spain in 200555 
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The Spanish market has been the fastest growing one in the EU since 1980 due to the 
introduction of a large number of CCGTs. The overwhelming majority of the gas consumed 
in Spain is imported. Spain has also complied with the Gas Directive faster than required. 
Gas Natural, the result of a merger between Catalana de Gas, Gas Madrid and some of the 
assets of Repsol Butano, is the most important natural gas player in Spain (EIA 2004). Prior 
to liberalization, Gas Natural controlled supply, distribution and transportation of natural 
gas. Upon liberalization, Gas Natural was forced by the government to sell a 40% stake in 
Enagas (the transportation operator, 4500 miles of infrastructure), henceforth reducing its 
stake to 25% 
-this is expected to be reduced to 5% by 2007. Enagas is a public company, 
50% of its shares are owned by the state, and the rest is owned by a number of gas 
operators. Spanish electricity utilities: Endesa, Union Fenosa, and Iberdrola have gained 
market share in the gas market. 
Imported pipeline gas to Spain comes from Norway through France and the Pedro Duran 
Farell pipeline, transporting gas from Algeria through Morocco. Portugal is also linked to 
this pipeline. 
The Medgaz project, a pipeline linking Algeria to Spain directly, and France thereafter, is in 
an advanced stage of planning by a consortium led by Spain's Cepsa (20%) and Algeria's 
Sonatrach (20%). Medgaz is expected to start operating in 2008/9. Refer to the section 3.2 in 
this chapter for details about the Euskadi pipeline project led by Total. 
Spain has four LNG import facilities: Barcelona (1.12 Bcf/d), Cartagena (760 Mmcf/d), 
Huelva (760 Mmcf/d) and Bilbao (740 Mmcf/d). A terminal in Valencia is being built by 
union Fenosa, Iberdrola, and Endesa. Union Fenosa and Endesa are also building a terminal 
in north«-cst Spain, El Ferrol. 
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Union Fenosa also owns a stake in the Damietta terminal in Egypt and has a minority 
interest in the construction of an expansion to the Qalhat terminal in Oman. Gas Natural 
and Repsol have also been awarded the integrated project of Gassi Touil in Algeria 
(including upstream production, liquefaction and shipping). 
On the macro level, as discussed earlier, Figure 3-17 shows the exponential growth that 
natural gas consumption witnessed in Spain. Natural gas now represents a significant part of 
Spain's primary energy mix (Figure 3-18). From the natural gas procurement viewpoint, 
Figure 3-19 shows the more LNG intensive nature of Spanish procurement (compared with 
France and Italy). Finally, Figure 3-20, Figure 3-21 and Table 3-3 show the pipelines, LNG 
and contracted volumes portfolios for Spain. 
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Spain Primary Energy Consumption Mix (2004) 
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Figure 3-18 Spain's primary energy consumption mix57 
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Contracts to Spain 
Norway to Spain 
Algeria to Spain (H) 
Algeria to Spain (C ) 
Algeria to Spain (B) 
Nigeria to Spain 
Algeria to Spain 
Trinidad to Spain (H) 
Trinidad to Spain (B) 
Libya to Spain 
Spain to Portugal 
Table 3-3 Contracted volumes to Spain61 
3.5 Longterm contracts 
Port de Larau 
LNG 
LNG 
LNG 
LNG 
G. Maghreb- 
Europa 
LNG 
LNG 
LNG 
LNG 
Bcm/year 
2003 
2.1 
0.83 
0.1 
2.37 
4.3 
6 
0.85 
0.85 
1 
2.8 
Information about natural gas contracts in the region is normally confidential. However, 
some consulting firms, such as Gas Strategies, publish "assumed" contract terms that are 
based on market observations and discussions with market actors. 
In the European Market, Natural Gas purchased under long term contracts is priced 
according to substitute commodities often crude oil and sometimes -but rarely nowadays- 
coal. 
Gis Str, itc ics Online (2005) 
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According to the assumptions of Gas Strategies, the system used to calculate the price 
prevailing is a formula comprising three "variables" (Data period 
- 
Time lag 
- 
Price 
recalculation frequency). The price is calculated using the weighted differences added to a 
price Po which is negotiated upfront. 
For example the Algeria-Spain LNG contract is priced, on a netback basis (that is to 
calculate P0), indexed to a basket of crude on a "6-0-3" formula. This means that Natural 
Gas will be priced according to the average of Breakeven Rotterdam Price Average of eight 
crudes (Sahara Blend, Brass River, Zueitina, Murban, Kirkuk, Light Iranian, and Light 
Arabian) for the last six months. Immediately prior to the contract pricing point (the second 
variable is 0) and that the price will be recalculated every three months. 
From To Type Pricing 
Algeria Spain LNG Basket of crudes @ 6-0-3 
Libya Spain LNG Unknown 
Nigeria 
Trinidad 
Norway 
Algeria 
Algeria 
Netherlands 
(2 Low sulfur fuel oil 
63 High sulfur fuel oil 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
France 
France 
LNG LSFO62 (40%), HSFO63 
(26%), Gas Oil (34%) @ 6-0- 
3 
LNG LSFO (30%), HSFO (30%), 
Gas Oil (40%) @ 6-0-3 
Pipeline LSFO (35%), HSFO (27%), 
Gas Oil (38%) @ 6-0-3 
Pipeline LSFO (30%), HSFO (30%), 
Gas Oil (40%) @ 6-0-3 
LNG 
Pipeline 
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Norway France Pipeline LSFO (37.3"ä)C 6-0-3, 
Producer Price Index 
(22.5°'(), Gas Oil (40°o) @ 9- 
0-3 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Russia 
Algeria 
Netherlands 
Russia 
Nigeria 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Italy 
Italy 
Italy 
Italy 
Table 3-4 Examples of LTC terms to Europe64 
Pipeline Gas Oil (63%) @ 6-1-3, 
LSFO (37%) @ 3-1-3 
Pipeline Gas Oil (55%) @ 9-0-1, 
LSFO (45%) @ 6-0-1 
Pipeline Gas Oil (75%), LSFO (25%) 
@ 9-0-1 
Pipeline Unknown 
Pipeline Unknown 
Pipeline Gas Oil (75%), LSFO (25%) 
@ 9-0-1 
LNG Indexed to coal prices, as 
detailed below 
Another example is the Italia 
- 
Nigeria contract to ENEL. Gas Strategies believes that these 
contracts are priced as using the following components: 
3Q% Brent Crude (FOB Sullom Voe) @ 6-0-3 
20% High Sulphur Fuel Oil (HSFO 
- 
CIF Med. ) @ 6-0-3 
20% Low Sulphur Fuel Oil (LSFO 
- 
CIF Med. ) @ 6-0-3 
20'%, Coal (CIF Italy ports average) @ 6-0-3 
10% Inflation factor (OECD average) 
Fl()-\\, c\ver, coal indexation is rarely used due to the low substitution factor between coal and 
GS 
natural gas if compared with crude oil and the difficulty of finding reliable coal pricing data. 
64 Source: Gas Strategies 2003 
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3.6 Producing countries 
Suppliers to the North Mediterranean block are numerous and trade through pipeline is 
significantly higher than that through LNG. Pipeline trade flows are usually Long Term 
Contracts whereas LNG trade flows are mixtures of LTCs and spot trade. In terms of LNG, 
Spain has the most diversified supplier-base, in accordance with its energy import policy of 
diversification. Due to its geographical proximity, Algeria is by far the largest LNG exporter 
to the block. In terms of pipeline, Russian, Algerian and Norwegian gas compete, followed 
by the Netherlands and the UK (small quantities to France). Spain only imports pipeline gas 
from Algeria and Norway whereas France and Italy import from other suppliers such as the 
Netherlands and Russia. There is no direct pipeline connection between Algeria and France, 
which explains the high quantities imported by LNG. 
Algeria is the first natural gas exporter to the block with 45.16 BCM, 60% of which is 
exported via pipeline. Italy is Algeria's first client with a 50% export share followed by Spain 
(27%) and France (23%). Algeria's reserves are estimated to 4.52 TCM with a current R/P 
ratio of 56 years. Algeria has a privileged position due to its geographical proximity resulting 
in low transportation costs as well as low extraction costs. There are two major projects 
underway for the construction of two new pipelines in the next 5 years from Algeria to Italy 
and Spain, which will come to supplement the pipelines already operating 66 
The Russian Federation does not vet export LNG but is the second supplier of the block 
and the first one by pipeline (30.70 BCM). Russian gas going to Italy represents 63% of the 
former exports. France is the other client of Russia in the block. The Russian Federation sits 
on the world's largest reserves with 47.57 TCM (more than 10 times those of Algeria) and a 
65 Source: Gas Strategies 2002 
66 Source: Benbouzid. H, Sonatrach London, personal communication (2003) 
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high R/P ratio with the current production figures of 554.9 BCM covering both local 
consumption and exports. Russian gas is impeded by high costs of transportation to the 
block. 
Norway and the Netherlands follow in the list. Both of these countries are perceived as 
suppliers with much lower credit risk and higher (geo)political stability, the Netherlands 
being a member of the European Union, which provides their gas with preferential tariffs 
and other trade treatments. Norway and the Netherlands exported 21.32 and 16.60 BCM1 in 
2004, respectively, exclusively by pipeline. Norway's and the Netherlands' reserves of 2.19 
and 1.79 TCM only allows them for around 30 years R/P ratio at the current production 
levels. This has to be taken into account together with their rising consumption, especially 
for the Netherlands, which only exports a third of its production (compared to its 
competitors who export a higher share). 
Nigeria is the newcomer to the North-Mediterranean gas import market. Due to its 
geographical position, Nigeria can only export LNG for the time being, however discussions 
are under way for the construction of a 2500 kilometres pipeline (the Trans-Saharian Gas 
Pipeline) transporting Nigerian gas to through the Algerian existing and planned pipeline 
infrastructure to Europe. Nigeria exports 5.91 BCM worth of LNG to the block with 60% 
of it going to Italy, 27% of it going to Spain and 23% to France (comparable export 
portfolio weights to those of Algeria). Nigeria sits on 3.51 TCM of gas with an R/P ration 
currently reaching 198 years. 
Other current exporters are the UK (1.29 BCM by pipeline to France). Spain imports small 
quantities of LNG from a number of other countries: Trinidad and Tobago 0.46 BCM, 
Oman 0. ^ '6 BCM (Oman also exports to France), Qatar 2.20 BCM, The UAE 0.50 BCNI, 
Libya 0.63 BCMI, Australia 0.07 BCM1 and Brunei 0.08 BCM. 
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Libya's 1.31 TCM reserves and its low consumption give it the potential to be an exporter 
with growing market share. Egypt is also involved in LNG projects and negotiations for 
LTCs with some countries of the block and with its reserves of 1.66 TCM it is also expected 
to grab a growing market share. Both Libya and Egypt are favoured by the low 
transportation costs due to their proximity to the market. 
Iran and Qatar with their important reserves of 23 TCM and 14.4 TCM respectively-, their 
low cost of extraction and their high R/P ratios (356 and 491 respectively) make them 
serious contenders for market, the former by pipeline and the latter by LNG. 
3.7 Market liberalization, Security of supply and the Mediterranean, a 
discussion 
The ongoing liberalization of markets in Europe and the increasing awareness about security 
of supply has prompted discussions about whether the former could represent a problem to 
the latter. 
If firms evolve in a competitive market, there is a price response to supply and demand. If 
also total demand is assumed to be less price elastic than supply67, this will create a market 
where prices are determined mostly by supply and capacity. However, infrastructurally- 
constrained markets of this sort usually display strong cyclical behaviour, driven mainly by 
investment lags. When there is abundance of capacity, prices are low. Accordingly, profits 
are squeezed and there is small investment in infrastructure which leads, when demand 
catches on, to a scarcity of capacity which itself pushed prices up. 
67 This is a reasonable assumption since markets are not fully open and that evidence in other energy markets 
including oil and electricity suggest that demand is more responsive to exogenous variables than endogenous 
ones 
-i. c. price 
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This can be observed in many already regulated markets. Taking the UK as an example, 
Wright (2004) "contests the view held by the current UK government and its industry 
regulator, OFGEM, that liberalization is good for security of supply". In fact, he argues, "it 
has increased uncertainty and failing to signal adequate appropriate investment". The IEA in 
its "Security of Supply in Open Markets", discussing the EU market liberalisation, argues 
that open markets will not by themselves value investment in insurance assets to ensure 
secure supplies to the end-consumer under low-probability/high-impact events. Banks 
(2004) also argues that blackouts and crises similar to the California electricity crisis could 
happen under specific market conditions if the market is liberalized. 
The EU Council Directive concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply 
lists provisions such as minimum targets, gas coordination group for cases of major supply 
disruption and other policies. When asked about the link between liberalization and security 
of supply, the EU Commission Directorate for Transportation and Energy (DGTREN) 
stated that there were no major issues and that it was the role of EU mechanisms and 
national regulators to tackle this. Indeed, Frisch (1999) suggests that new forms of contracts, 
under liberalised markets, would ensure security of supply. 
In effect, the DGTREN argues, the liberalization of the market and the implementation of 
the competition rules will create an environment where market forces and regulators are 
more responsivc to market signals than governments and monopolistic firms. 
From a trade point of view, liberalization means that decision-making in infrastructure 
investment (regasification terminals) and partners, which used to be taken at a macro level 
((Y, 
-overnment and incumbent), will now be taken at the micro level (by competitive, 
theoretically non colluding, firms). This means, in line with the cvclicality argument above, 
that there will be periods of over regasification capacity and period of under regasification 
capacity. In fact, there is an increasing concern the Spain and Italy, who are the most 
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liberalized LNG importers of the EU, are already over/under supplied. In the winter 
2005/2006, the UK has also witnessed strong upward price-pressures due to under-supply 
It is worth pointing out that there are attempts to address this problematic of security of 
supply in the Mediterranean at the political levels also. In the spirit of the Barcelona Process 
(the dialogue of EU Member States with their neighbours of the South initiated in the 
Barcelona Conference of November 1995), the Euromed Forum for Energy has been 
established and has met several times to discuss promoting infrastructure projects, empower 
institutions and encourage integration and standards uniformisation. This institution is still 
loosely structured and meets infrequently68. 
It is in this framework that the next chapters will provide a tool to assess infrastructure 
needs and partner choices, by modelling new capacity and new trade flows and allowing for 
the simulation of incidents, based on the assumption that security of supply is best 
safeguarded if decisions are made on the macro-level and comparing these benchmarks 
produced by the model with current proposed projects. 
The next chapter will discuss with details the consumption patterns in France, Italy and 
Spain. 
68 Hallouche (2005) 
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4. Natural gas demand in France, Italy and Spain 
This chapter examines, econometrically, the past trends of natural gas consumption in 
France, Italy and Spain for the domestic and industrial sectors and discusses the results. 
Natural Gas, the so-called fuel of the 21s` century, is gaining market share as a primary 
energy source in world consumption, particularly in Europe. The need to decrease 
dependence on other sources, such as oil, and on foreign imports as well as a move towards 
more energy efficient and environment friendly fuels provides natural gas with high 
prospects of growth both in nominal consumption figures and in market share in the 
medium-term future. 
Natural gas infrastructure investment calls for large capital outlay, comparatively to other 
energy sources like oil refining and transportation. The investment profile is also front- 
loaded. Understanding the demand dynamics of natural gas is of paramount importance for 
infrastructure planning, especially in a market in the infant stage of its liberalization, as the 
French, Italian and Spanish markets are. There is, nonetheless, little research work on how 
this demand is evolving in these markets. 
4.1 Literature review 
Literature on the estimation of demand for energy, and natural gas, is abundant. Most of it, 
however, is concentrated on the US market, this is principally due to the availability of data. 
M1ac. Avoy & Moshkin (2000) attempt to predict long-term well-head natural gas prices in the 
US using simulations and a partial equilibrium model. The system consists of simultaneous 
equations for production from reserves and for demand for production in the residential, 
commercial and industrial sectors. The model has predicted a long-term negative price trend 
in the US well-head natural gas market. 
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One of the important features of this model, one which is relevant to this research, is the 
equations related to the demand side of natural gas in the US. The model uses the following 
variables as explanatory ones: 
Industrial demand: 
- 
Industrial production 
- 
Lagged NG industrial consumption 
- 
Natural Gas price for industry 
- 
Weighted average of other fuel prices for industry (coal, gas and oil) 
- 
It is worthwhile noting that the model assumes 
-and proves- a breakpoint using 
dummy variables 
Electric Utility demand: 
- 
Lagged consumption of NG for electrical utility 
- 
Personal consumption expenditure 
- 
Natural Gas price for electricity generation 
- 
Weighted average other fuel prices for electricity generation (coal, gas, oil and 
nuclear) 
Commercial demand: 
- 
Lagged consumption of NG for commercial use 
- 
Personal consumption expenditure 
- 
Natural Gas price for commercial use 
Weighted average of other fuel prices for commercial use (coal, gas, oil and nuclear) 
Rcsidential demand: 
- 
Lagged consumption of NG for residential use 
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- 
Personal consumption expenditure 
- 
Natural Gas price for residential use 
- 
Weighted average of other fuel prices for residential use (coal, gas, oil and nuclear) 
Putting together the latter demand model with a set of six equations used for the supply side 
and involving new exploratory activity, reserves, development activity and production, the 
paper constructs a partial equilibrium model with total demand and total supply functions. 
With R square figures between 93% and 95% the model predicts a long term significant 
decrease in US well-head natural gas prices due to new technologies of exploration; however 
the depletion of natural gas reserves reduces faster relatively to the demand. Such 
relationship puts downward pressure on the price as supply increase is, in relative and 
expected terms, proportionally higher than demand. 
The demand side of this model has some features of the top-down approach. It takes into 
consideration both total energy demand and shares of different competitor sources. On the 
supply side, the model takes into account the most important variables, but does not include 
the cost of extraction, which is widely considered to be an important factor for the supply 
estimation. The paper displays a strong model with robust estimation results in terms of R- 
square and also forecasts that can be checked against actual development. However, it deals 
with natural gas in an internal market, with market driven supply, demand and prices, and in 
a region where data is available. As important as the contribution of this paper is, it cannot 
be used for an international market with a different, and changing, structure. Only 
components thereof will hence be exploited. 
Garcia-Cerrutti (2000) estimates elasticities of residential energy demand from a panel county 
data using dynamic random variables models with heteroskedastic and correlated error 
terms. This piece of research is inspired from Dahl (1993) who looks at the cross-sectional 
responses of energy consumption due to changes in demand factors. The variables used are 
91/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
energy prices, income and weather. This research conducted using panel data and attempting 
both cross-sectional fixed and cross-sectional variant coefficients and testing the models 
resulting therefrom. The Garcia-Cerrutti (2000) research looks at a panel of 44 counties in 
California, US. These counties are chosen to represent different population and population 
growth profiles. The panel data uses a dynamic random variables model that treats the 
constants of the regression as cross-sectional and time varying, as opposed to having fixed 
constants or cross-sectional variant constants. 
The research aims mainly at calculating natural gas residential elasticity but addresses also 
electricity's. This research concludes that "county variations in the responses to changes in 
prices, income and weather make ineffective the use of econometric techniques assuming 
complete cross-county homogeneity or heterogeneity of the responses in both electricity and 
natural gas demands". Panel data at the county level, according to the paper, represent 
accurately the variations in prices, income and weather that occur within the state. These 
inspire partly from Hsing (1994) which constructs three models using a log-lin approach for 
the regional residential demand for electricity based on panel data of five southern states of 
the USA during 1981-90. The three models are: OLS; a CSHTWA (cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic time wise autoregressive) model; and a CSCTWA (cross sectionally 
correlated and time wise autoregressive) model. The variables used are price of substitution, 
disposable income, price of natural gas, and weather (Heating Degree-Days and Cooling 
Degree-Days). The latter model, namely CSCTWA, yields more efficient estimates. Under 
this model, all the elasticities are found to be significant and in a sign suiting economic 
theory, however some elasticities are found to be different from those obtained in other 
research for the United States. 
Both of the above articles use similar estimation methods for natural gas consumption and 
its elasticities towards different other factors such as prices, weather and income. Depending 
on the stationarity conditions of the data these papers do not attempt to look at different 
term elasticities through the use of cointegration methods nor do they discover any short- 
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term and long-term elasticities effects. Additionally, it is possible to check for elasticities for 
upward and downward price movement separately (asymmetric price response) which was 
not expressed in both articles. Indeed the literature of price asymmetry, notable example of 
which are Ryan & Plourde (2002) find significance for non-transport oil demand and Griffin 
& Schulman (2005) find significant price asymmetry in energy per capita. 
On the other hand, some of the approaches used for these articles are potentially useful to 
the present research, as the data frequency available does not allow for more elaborate 
econometric analysis. 
Balestra & Nerlove (1966) use the panel data method to estimate a regression panel of 36 
states over six years (time series and cross-sectional data) and uses a number of macro- 
economic and endogenous variables. Other approaches include Bohi (1981) and Hartman 
(1979), respectively offering methodologies for some of the papers above and discussing the 
frontiers of energy modelling. Also, Halvorsen (1978) offers econometric models for the US 
energy demand. A research for the OPEC review of 1990, by Brennand & Walker, looks at 
the effect of the level of income growth on income elasticities for the demand of energy. 
Beenstock & Willstocks (1981) look at the relationship between economic activity and 
energy demand in industrialised countries. 
Liu & Lin (1991) in turn look at the patterns of residential natural gas consumption in 
Taiwan. Price and a proxy for weather are used as explanatory variables. The objective of 
this research is forecasting. An intervention model and outlier detection and adjustment 
methods are used to tackle governmental price intervention and the treatment of outliers, 
respectively. Both monthly and quarterly data are used and quarterly data offers a higher 
performance in terms of RMSE both in sample and out-of-sample. The weather proxy used 
is the temperature, although the data set normally utilized in the literature is HDD and CDD 
(Heating Degree Days and Cooling Degree Days). Further, the paper identifies some 
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problems regarding the reality of the data for prices used and its potential effect on the 
integrity of the model (i. e. the government price interventions. ) 
Uri (1989) offers a parsimonious model for the estimation of agricultural natural gas demand 
with respect to other variables including substitution prices. The model estimated is a log-log 
model with natural gas prices for agriculture use, weighted average substitute prices for 
agriculture use, total income for farmers, CDD and HDD. The data are monthly between 
1978 and 1980 and cross-sectional by states. The results show an R-square of over 90% with 
significant (and with signs concordant with theory) parameters. The paper suggests that 
natural gas prices affect consumption and other energy prices also affect natural gas prices 
through substitution. Income and weather also have a significant effect. 
Engle & Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991) have offered new grounds for the estimation 
of energy consumption/demand, especially for the long term, through error correction 
models and cointegration. Lin, Chen & Chatov (1987) pioneer modern cointegration analysis 
of energy demand, using an error correction component model composed of nine equations; 
it analyses the demand for natural gas, electricity and heating oil in the United States. The 
Avery Component Model is used on a system of simultaneous equations with a SUR 
correction, due regard being given to short term and long term income and price elasticities 
and speeds of adjustment. The nine equations are residential, commercial and industrial 
estimates for natural gas, electricity and fuel oil, and the variables are prices and income. The 
results of the estimation show that the elasticities for price and income against consumption 
are significant in the short run and increases in the long run. Also, the elasticities are 
significantly different across fuel, region and use and, again, between the short run and the 
long run. One of the interesting results of this paper is the cross-elasticities of prices 
between the three fuels used, which shows that there is some level of substitution. 
This paper exhibits an interesting research on the patterns of energy consumption for 
regions and sub-regions in the United States; it also shows results compared by fuel, by 
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sector or use, by region, by sub-region, nationally and also compared between long-term 
response and short-term response. The model is parsimonious and the results concord with 
economic theory. For the needs of the present research, this paper's methodology may be 
highly important; the only problem is the frequency of data and the number of data-points 
needed. One other remark is the non-inclusion of weather variables. 
Bentzen (1994) and Bentzen & Engsted (1993) both use cointegration techniques for the 
estimation of energy sources demand in Denmark and they are both interested in short run 
and long run elasticities using Danish annual data for 1948 to 1990. They both use price and 
income as explanatory variables as it is common in the literature. The first one of them 
concentrates on gasoline consumption and the second one on total energy consumption. 
The first paper (1994) proves that there is a stable relationship and positive long-term 
elasticities between the price, income and gasoline consumption. The signs and magnitudes 
of the parameters are said to be of the `right expected magnitude' and no evidence of a 
structural break due to the oil shock of 1973-1974 was found. Again, this methodology is 
appropriate for the problematic at hand, but it is data-hungry. 
Exactly the same results are found in the second paper (1993), which looks at aggregate 
consumption, both in terms of the signs, significance and magnitude of the parameters and 
the absence of evidence for a structural break due to the oil price shock in 1973-1974. In 
addition, this paper offers some forecasts, which, it claims, concord to some extent with 
other official forecasts. The paper, however, does not offer any in-sample forecasts that 
could have added to its integrity. The Stock-Watson Dynamic OLS approach is used by Al- 
Azzam & Hawden (2004) to estimate the aggregate demand for energy in Jordan using a 
lead/lag of 3 days. The model is log-log and it uses real price, real income, constructed area69 
in square meters and a dummy variable for political events. By using a normal error 
correction model separately and comparing the results with those obtained with the former 
69 Urban area within the land 
- 
used as a proxy for transportation needs 
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model, long-term bias is reported to be found. The paper found, inter alia, that demand was 
not elastic to price. The constructed area variable was initially used by Pyndick (1974) but 
was not predominantly used in recent literature, especially the one concerning natural gas 
consumption. Total area constructed is usually used for crude oil and crude oil products 
consumption. 
Al-Azzam & Hawden follows many of the methodologies used in cointegration analysis for 
different energy sources consumptions, but it innovates in the use of the new Stock-Watson 
Dynamic OLS approach and in the use of variables not commonly used. It should, however, 
have commented on causalities as they have a major importance in policy implications, also 
the paper could have looked at short and long term elasticities, which is possible under the 
used cointegration technique and which would have been an interesting addition. 
Note that the cointegation technique used in this paper was first introduced by Masih & 
Masih (1996) in an article in Energy Economics entitled "Stock-Watson dynamic OLS 
(DOLS) and error correction modelling approaches to estimating long and short term 
elasticities in a demand function: new evidence and methodological implications from an 
application to the demand for coal in mainland China". This paper borrows the technique 
introduced by Stock & Watson (1993). Masih & Masih (1996b) offer a cointegration 
approach but on a panel data basis. 
4.2 Data 
The data used for the needs of the model in natural gas consumption observations for 
France, Italy and Spain for residential, commercial, power generation and industrial needs. 
Such data covers the time period between 1978 and 2000, inclusive, and are collected from 
the International Energy Agency (IEA)l" in Terra Joules (TJ) (calorific measure as opposed 
IE: \ Energy Statistics of OECD countries CD 
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to volume measure). Natural Gas end-user prices (including tax) for domestic, power 
generation and industrial consumption and assumed substitutes thereof are, when possible, 
also collected from the IEA"; the units are US Dollars per TJ. Substitutes for the three 
sectors are assumed to be electricity for domestic consumption, steam coal for power 
generation and fuel oil for industrial consumption; the units are US Dollars per respective 
unit. Finally, different macro-economic indicators such as population (in millions), Gross 
Domestic Product (in billion US Dollars), Industrial Production (index number) and Home 
Expenditure (in billion US Dollars) are collected from the IMF^,. 
The following shall look at the statistical properties of the data collected, outlined in the 
table below. For power generation consumption, Italy heads the list with a little more than 
350000 TJ on average followed by France and Spain. France and Italy's observations are 
normally distributed using the Jarque-Bera statistics. It is important to note that nuclear 
energy represents an average of 75% of France's electricity generation energy needs. Spain 
generates its electricity mainly with coal (38%), nuclear (32%) and natural gas only accounts 
for 3.5%. Italy, on the other hand, yields its electricity from oil (45%), natural gas (21%) and 
coal (13%). For Industrial consumption, Italy heads the list with an average of 61900 TJ. 
Italy's natural gas industrial consumption also has the highest standard deviation. Industrial 
consumption for all countries is normally distributed with a 5% confidence interval. France's 
industrial energy consumption is obtained, on average, from oil (35%), gas (28%) and 
electricity (23%). Italy and Spain's industrial consumption pies are 30%, 37%, 24% and 41%, 
21%, 25%, respectively. Coal accounts for the rest of industrial consumption for the three 
countries. 
For commercial consumption, France is the first with an average of almost 30000 TJ - 
approximately 3 times that of Italy. For residential, or domestic, consumption, Italy tops the 
IEA Energy Prices and Taxes CD 
72 INIF International Financial Statistics Database 
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FRANCE 
Mean 
Range 
list with 67000 TJ, approximately double France and triple Spain. All residential and 
commercial natural gas consumption series are normally distributed on a 5% coefficient 
interval. In the transport sector (included with commercial in the present analysis) oil 
represents virtually the totality of energy consumption for all three countries. As for 
domestic and commercial consumptions (combined), the market share is for France 32% oil, 
35% gas and 25% electricity, for Italy 30% oil, 44% gas and 24% electricity and for Spain 
44% oil, 8% gas and 42% electricity. 
Moving on to prices, and noting that France's natural gas end user price for power 
generation is not available, it can be seen that Spain's power generation natural gas price is 
25% higher than that of Italy, on average. Spain's Industrial gas price is also approximately 
16% higher than that of Italy and France, on average. Finally, Spain's residential natural gas 
end user price is, on average, also higher than Italy's, by an average of 2%, and higher than 
that of France by an average of 20%. Natural Gas, for all sectors, is therefore more 
73 expensive in Spain and, notwithstanding power generation, is least expensive in France. 
A general trend that can be observed is that all consumption figures are increasing, with 
different volatilities and with different slopes. Industrial Consumption shows, in general, the 
highest slope of increase. The domestic consumption of Italy also shows a high slope during 
the studied period. The analysis herein takes into account average figures which only give an 
indication about the size of the industry over the studied period. 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
Power Industrial Comma Resida Industrial Domestic Power Gen. 
Generation Consumption Cons cons Gas Price Gas Price Gas price 
36246.61 532959.7 295861.5 335619.9 153.2135 417.5378 NA 
67098 297352 232593 221395 88.92 211.48 NA 
73 All market share figures are obtained from IEA statistics 
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Std. Dev. 19569.34 81162.87 73710.43 65738.98 21.98556 54.6767 NA 
jarque-Bera 4.164834 1.144928 1.373806 1.22463 1.167283 1.217063 NA 
probability 0.124629 0.564134 0.503132 0.542094 0.557863 0.544149 NA 
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Figure 4-1 Commercial, Power Generation, Domestic and Industrial Gas Consumption in France in 
Terra Joules74 
Power Indus Comma Resid Industrial 
ITALY Generation Cons Cons Cons Gas Price 
Mean 348477.6 617866.8 11517.13 669768.7 155.4865 
Range 763195 401512 5505 635747 114.36 
Std. Dev. 203380.9 127350.7 1332.311 215736 34.40783 
Jarque-Bera 3.823249 1.992096 3.146164 2.025371 3.211969 
probability 0.14784 0.369336 0.207405 0.363242 0.200692 
74 Source IEA (2003) 
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Domestic Power Gen. 
Gas Price Gas price 
490.4 127.093 
625.01 132.55 
208.1337 34.12229 
2.273214 0.317216 
0.320906 0.853331 
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Figure 4-2 Commercial, Power Generation, Domestic and Industrial Gas Consumption in Italy in 
Terra Joules75 
Power Indus Comm Resid Industrial Domestic Power Gen. 
SPAIN Generation Cons Cons Cons Gas Price Gas Price Gas price 
Mean 45113.43 160164.3 9396.783 27079.83 179.163 499.6752 167.9761 
Range 125212 423889 26801 88059 193.41 463.72 163.53 
Std. Dev. 37999.56 125235.2 8467.064 27289.39 54.36129 105.8579 42.93427 
)argue-Bera 11.16339 2.031688 2.823675 3.673557 8.543108 1.124159 0.418922 
Probability 0.003766 0.362097 0.243695 0.15933 0.01396 0.570022 0.811021 
75 Source IEA (2003) 
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Figure 4-3 Commercial, Power Generation, Domestic and Insdustrial Gas Consumption in Spain in 
Terra Joules76 
4.2.2 Weather data 
Referring to the literature above, weather is clearly an important variable to be included in 
energy consumption estimation, particularly residential consumption. With the exception of 
the paper by Moral-Carcedo & Vicens-Otero (2005) who estimate electricity consumption in 
Spain, the literature including weather is not voluminous. 
The variables normally used as a proxy for weather are HDD (heating degree days) or CDD 
(cooling degree days). The CDD and HDD datasets are not available for France, Italy and 
Spain. They have therefore to be constructed. According to Plourde (2005), in order to 
construct the variables, daily temperature data has to be collected. A base temperature of 18 
Cclcius is usually used as follows: Dav_HDD(i = 1, if the average temperature of day d is 
smaller than the base temperature. Day_HDD({ = 0, if the average temperature of day d is 
higher than the base temperature. Then, the yearly proxy for weather is calculated as the sum 
of the daily HDD: HDD, _ Day 
- 
HDDd 
, 
" Source IEA (2003) 
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Temperature data for France, Italy and Spain is collected from the Met Offices of these 
countries and constructed HDD present the following results: 
HDD Weather Progression 
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Figure 4-4 HDD data for France, Italy and Spain77 
" Author's calculations based on Plourde (2005) and French, Italian and Spanish Meteorological Offices data 
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4.3 Estimating Natural Gas Demand 
Figure 4-5 Estimation Methodologies for Natural Gas78 
Based on the literature review, above, and other research in natural gas demand, such as 
Honore (2005), the above classification of estimation methods for natural gas is proposed. 
Natural gas can either be estimated as a share of total primary energy consumption (whereby 
total primary consumption is estimated 
-using variables detailed in the diagram, the share of 
natural gas therefrom is estimated). This method is referred to as "top-down". This 
methodology, though corresponding to many observers' beliefs in long-term economic 
reality, offers statistical challenges for forecasting since natural gas consumption is the result 
of the product of two econometric forecasts (forecast of the total primary energy 
author's diaorrammatical representation of -, ays by vvhich natural gas consumption can be cstimatcd for 
France, Italy and France. Arrow indicates level at which estimation in this thesis is done 
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consumption and forecast of the natural gas market share). This method is more appropriate 
for long-term (30 years) estimation and is excluded, as it is data-hungry (in terms of the 
historic data needed to run the regressions). Indeed, error correction models were run for 
the three countries, unsuccessfully. 
Another way to estimate natural gas consumption is to observe the behaviour for all sub- 
sectorial activity (e. g. different industries such as the metal industry, food and tobacco, 
textile, also residential, different power generation potential... etc). This method has the 
potential to be the most precise one as it looks at different exogenous variables in a more 
detailed way, however this method offers the challenge of being too reliant on data that is 
difficultly obtainable. This method is more appropriate for short term forecasting (5 years). 
The direct approach would have been interesting if there was elastic short-term substitution 
in the gas industry, which is not the case. It is excluded as it fails to capture long-term trends, 
as the top down approach does, and fails to capture short term variations as the bottom up 
method does. 
Power generation demand is dependent on the power plants for each country, an exhaustivc 
account of which is already presented by Honore (2005). 
The model, presented below, takes commercial and residential consumptions as one variable. 
Also, the historic data availability requires the model to be estimated using a simple Panel 
Data method with national specificities taken into account using intercept dummy variables. 
In order to take into account the stationarity of the data and the medium term scope of the 
forecasts, log-differences are used. 
4.4 Model & Results 
Other estimations showed that GDP did not have any statistically significant impact on 
industrial consumption, neither did prices of gas and substitutes. 
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Household expenditure, prices of gas and prices of substitutes did not have any statistically 
significant impact on the residential and commercial consumptions. This is because of 
regulated prices, asymmetric price response and lag time in price response. It is also due to 
low elasticity in energy consumption. 
Taking into account these realities of the natural gas in Europe, the model below is 
estimated: 
LogD(Re sid, ) =a+ /3LogD(Re sid (. , 
_, 
) + bLogD(HDD, t) + 
y(DUMMY_ ITALY) +B(DUMMY_FRANCE) +ec, 
LogD(Indus,, ) 
=a+ /3LogD(Indusc 
, 
_, 
) + &ogD(IPc, ) + 
y(DUMMY 
- 
ITALY) + B(DUMMY 
- 
FRANCE) + ec, t 
Equation 1 Model Specification for Industrial and Residential Consumption 
Where: 
Resid< 
< 
is the residential and commercial consumption of gas in country c at time t 
CDD< 
< 
is the Heating Degree Days in country c in year t (expected positive) 
DUMMY_ITALY takes the value of 1 for Italian consumption 
DUMMY_FRANCE takes the value of 1 for French consumption 
Indus, 
,t 
is the Industrial Consumption for country c at time t 
IPA is the Industrial Production for country c at time t (expected positive) 
LogD(var, ) 
= 
Log(var, ) 
- 
Log(var, 
_, 
) 
These models have yielded the following results: 
Rcsid & Commercial 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
C 0.0941 0.0212 
LogD(RESID(-1)) 0.3390 0.1083 
LogD(HDD) 0.1614 0.0637 
t-Statistic Prob. 
4.4460 0.0000 
3.1294 0.0026 
2.5315 0.013^' 
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FDUMMY 
-0.0703 0.0230 -3.0563 0.0032 
IDUMMY 
-0.0649 0.0224 -2.9003 0.0050 
R-squared 0.4160 Mean dependent var 0.0756 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3812 S. D. dependent var 0.0893 
S. E. of regression 0.0702 Akaike info criterion 
-2.4072 
Sum squared resid 0.3305 Schwarz criterion 
-2.2491 
Log likelihood 91.6592 F-statistic 11.9329 
Durbin-Watson sta t 2.0356 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 
Table 5 Results of the Estimation of residential & commercial consumption of gas 
Industrial 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
C 0.057818 0.018241 
LogD(IND(-1)) 0.367527 0.102687 
LogD(IP) 0.889552 0.267982 
DUMMY ITALY 
-0.062453 0.021174 
DUMMY FRANCE 
-0.058863 0.020633 
R-squared 0.469207 
Adjusted R-squared 0.437518 
S. E. of regression 0.065728 
Sum squared resid 0.28945 
Log likelihood 96.42817 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.938455 
Mean dependent var 
S. D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
t-Statistic Prob. 
3.16963 0.0023 
3.579094 0.0006 
3.319446 0.0015 
-2.949569 0.0044 
-2.852894 0.0058 
0.055554 
0.087639 
-2.539671 
-2.38157 
14.80657 
0 
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Table 6 Results of the Estimation of industrial consumption of gas 
The results yielded significant variables with the expected signs. 
The first model shows that in Spain, the driving force for growth is of 9% (constant term). 
In France and Italy, the trending growth will be of 2% and 3% respectively (this is calculated 
by adding up the constant term and the intercept dummy for each country). 
On top of these growth figures, France, Italy and Spain's gas consumption will also grow by 
33% of last years' growth, this is due to the legacy of decisions. The important contribution 
of this model shows that the growth in gas consumption is also affected by 16% of the 
increase/decrease in weather proxied by the HDD (the more days of heating needed, the 
more gas is consumed). 
On the industrial production side, again Spanish growth, ceterus paribus, is of 6%. French and 
Italian growths are close to nil. On top of this, all countries grow at 36% of last year's 
growth and 88% of Industrial Production. The reason why this is not a one-for-one growth 
is due to gained efficiency. 
4.5 Discussion 
The medium term (2013) prospect for energy, one where structural breaks will not have a 
noteworthy impact, given that the fleet of appliances is relatively young, will show a steady 
increase of industrial production of about 8% in Spain, which should be expected to slow 
down towards the last period. In France and Italy, this growth should be expected to be 
around 2.5% per vear. l"For residential consumption, it will continue its strong growth in 
Spain and will slow down from the current double-digit growth rates, and will have a steady 
increase by 2-3%, depending on the weather conditions, in France and Italy. 
'9 
, 
Assuming a 2°o industrial production growth 
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Growth Rate Sensitivity to Weather, Example for 2010 
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Figure 4-6 Sensitivity of Growth to Weather in France, Italy and Spain 
Taking into account that the these countries are not self sufficient in natural gas imports and 
that pipelines have their limitations, the timing of investment in LNG infrastructure is 
henceforth crucial. The following chapter looks at the French, Italian and Spanish gas 
consumptions and the investment patterns in LNG infrastructure. 
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5. Determinants of decision marking in import infrastructure 
for French, Italian and Spanish gas markets 
This chapter will investigate the determinants of decision making in the timing of the 
investment in import infrastructure as well as the choice of the partner in gas trade for 
France, Italy and Spain, using econometric methods. 
5.1 Introduction 
Decision-making on investment projects are usually based on the economic viability, usually 
expressed as the Net Present Value (NPV) based on a given discount rate. This discount rate 
is usually calculated based on the elements of risk that the project may entail. Other methods 
such as the Internal Rate of Return, Payback Periods and other more advanced valuation and 
investment appraisal tools are also used. 
Middle-stream projects for natural gas buyers refer to regasification terminals and pipelines, 
in effect capacities of import. The determinants of decision making for these projects are 
different. 
Arguably, natural gas is a strategic commodity. Continuity of supply is henceforth crucial, 
especially in winter. Notwithstanding also the industrial use of natural gas, this fuel is more 
notably used for electricity generation, which is highly strategic to any economy. This is 
particularly true in countries where indigenous supply is low and where exports, either 
through pipeline or 
-more importantly- through LNG, are required. 
Natural gas projects, be it pipelines or LNG regasification terminals, are very- highly capital 
intensive. A typical pipeline may cost in the region of S1 million per kilometer and an LNG 
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regasification terminal may not cost less than $600 Millions80. Some of these projects are 
highly leveraged and bankers usually require long-term contracts as collateral. These Long 
Term Contracts (LTCs), traditionally have rigid Take-or-Pay provisions, indexed pricing 
mechanisms and, in some instances, destination clauses. 
The most important reason for the difference in determinants of natural gas middle-stream 
investment, however, remains the market structure of this industry. So far, natural gas 
projects were conducted by so-called "legal monopolies" (large utilities, usually state-owned) 
effectively acting on behalf of the state. Investment decisions were therefore not motivated 
solely 
-if at all- by the profitability of the project. Indeed, it was not a competitive market. 
Evidently, the market structure of the industry has been witnessing some changes, arguably 
important ones. The EU Commission Gas Directives81 that provide for a progressive 
liberalization of internal gas markets and the implementation thereof by EU member states 
should theoretically transform the market structure into a more competitive one. This being 
said, a slow implementation of this directive, past liberalization experiences for the EU (e. g. 
the telecommunications market) and the strong state involvement in some cases, raise 
questions about how imminent a possible structural break in the natural gas external trade is 
to be foreseen. 
In addition, natural gas differs from other industries in one other aspect of the trade: trade 
partners. While price, quality and credit-worthiness are the market determinants for 
"choosing" a trade partner, determinants in natural gas are also subject to its "strategic 
status". 
80 Willem Bloem, Shell, Presentation about Outlook for LNG at the 2nd Energy Risk Management Seminar, 
Cass Business School, 2004 
81 EU Directive 98/30/EC of 22nd June 1998 
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As mentioned above, LTCs are usually necessary to secure financing. In fact, LTCs are 
common, even predominant, trade instruments in natural gas. Because the length of LTCs 
has normally been 25-30 years, the relationship between the importing and the exporting 
company is of a high importance. Consequently, since both companies were (sometimes still 
are) typically monopolies in their respective countries, the relationship between the countries 
themselves became very important. 
The issue of security of supply, therefore, rose high up on the agenda. Buyers started to take 
measures to tackle that. Among the recommendations of the EU Commission Gas Security 
of Supply Directive82 was diversification of suppliers. Each of the studied countries 
-France, 
Italy and Spain- started in effect to diversify their portfolio of suppliers, refer to Figure 5-1, 
Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3. 
In fact, they have all moved from 1-2 suppliers to about 7 in a less than 20 years. Further, 
the Spanish government has even enforced a law banning any single producer from 
supplying more than 60% of the Spanish imports. 
The present chapter aims to (i) identify the elements of decision making for investment in 
middle-stream projects as well as (ii) the `choice' of partners as an a priori model. This model 
will then be tested using the discreet choice models. The chapter will comment on the results 
and have a forward looking analysis onto how these dynamic are likely to change in the 
future. 
82 EU Commission Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply of 
26 April 2004 
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Figure 5-1 French Contracted Volumes of Natural Gas, time series83 
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Figure 5-2 Italian Contracted Volumes of Natural Gas, time series84 
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Figure 5-3 Spanish Contracted Volumes of Natural Gas, time series85 
5.2 Literature Review 
Van Groendendaal (1998) provides a comprehensive analysis about the economic appraisal 
of natural gas projects. The elements identified are financial viability, economic viability, 
demand for natural gas, energy pricing policy, gas reserves, economic growth, identification 
of investment for the gas transmission system and environmental implications. The model 
that Van Groendendaal (1998) has been adapted from Julius (1985) and is presented below. 
As it can be observed, this model assumes availability of endogenous supply and is tested on 
Indonesia, which is in fact a gas exporter. It is believed that net gas exporters, particularly 
those with a high dependence, have different patterns for investment. Also, in modelling 
Author's calculations using BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2005), IEA (2003) and Gas Strategics 
Online (2005) 
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terms, because of lack of data for most of the variables that this framework calls for, it is 
statistically difficult to implement. 
Figure 5-4 Decision Making Model Developped by Van Groendendaal (1998) 
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In terms of decision making, Van Groendendaal (1998) also presents a number of Decision 
Support Systems bespoke for natural gas infrastructure, the most relevant one being the 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) Strategic Decision Model, outlined below. 
Figure 5-5 Decision Making Model Developped by Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Theoret (1976) 
The present paper focuses more on the first stage of "Recognition", in terms of 
infrastructure investment. 
Hayes & Victor (2005) provide some grounds into the determinants of natural gas cross- 
border transportation. This paper has a global focus and discusses analytically factors that 
determine investment in natural gas transport infrastructure. One of the models of this 
paper, below, is relevant both to the infrastructure investment and partner choice problems: 
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Figure 5-6 Decision Making Model Developed by Hayes & Victor (2004) 
While this paper pays more attention to pipelines and liquefaction terminals (not to 
regasification terminals), it provides an interesting framework: Factors for partners are 
looked at using an index system taking into account government stability, investment profile, 
internal conflict, corruption, law and order, ethics tensions and bureaucratic quality. A 
decision tree approach is then introduced based on these elements. 
The above model offers an interesting framework for a supply led micro (by project) system. 
The needs for the market under-study are different in that the model is assumed to be 
demand-led, which is a reasonable assumption based on the fact that most LNG projects are 
only undertaken if there is an off-taker. This leads on to assume also, on a macro level, that 
supply is abundant. 
In terms of analysing Long Term Contracts, Neumann & von Hirschhausen (2004), (2005) 
have looked extensively 
-using econometric tools, at their determinants. They find that Long 
Term Contracts are getting, ceteris paribus, shorter though Long Term Contracts linked to 
assets, such as liquefaction and regasification terminals, are longer. This research stems from 
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work by Coase (1937) on amendments of institutional economics, Richter and Furubotn 
(1999), Joskow (1987,1988) who shows that the duration of contracts in the American coal 
industry is positively related to the level of asset-specificity, Crocket and Masten (1985,1988) 
who have looked at the effect of institutional changes on the US gas market, Adelman et al 
(1986) who looked at security of supply in the oil markets and long term contracts, Bolle 
(1989) who investigated the ToP provisions of long term contracts. 
In order to determine a parsimonious model for decision making processes for infrastructure 
and partners for natural gas infrastructure, notwithstanding models presented in the 
literature above, discussions were held with several industry actors from the buyers and 
sellers as well as governments and industry observers including representatives from 
Sonatrach (the Algerian national oil company), the Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
representatives from the Qatar Government, The Observatoire Meditteraneen de l'Energie (OME 
-a research organization sponsored by major energy companies in the Mediterranean and 
Europe), Cepsa, Repsol, Egyptian National Gas Company, OPEC, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the EU Commission Directorate for Transportation and Energy (EU 
DGTREN), the French Ministry of Economics and Industry, Gas de France, ENI, Enel, 
Gas Natural, Gas Strategies and others. 
From these meetings, a pattern emerges. The a priori expectation is that infrastructure 
investments are motivated by expected spare capacity which in itself can be proxied by 
current spare capacity: Decision makers decide to invest in infrastructure at time t for this 
infrastructure to be operational at time t+n (n being the lag for financing and construction of 
the project) based on what they believe spare capacity will be in time t+n. This belief stems 
from the current spare capacity, the growth in consumption and other decisions on 
infrastructure projects that have been made prior to time t for completion prior to time t+n. 
In terms of choice of partners, diversification seems a priori to be the most important factor 
together with the distance (which proxies the competitiveness of the LTC; the shorter the 
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period, the more competitive the partner) and the political relationship. The dynamics were, 
from the discussions held for the present chapters and from the above-mentioned literature, 
that a buyer requiring a quantity of gas looks at different aspects to chose the partner: One 
of them is the current market share of this partner at the time of decision (a priori, the higher 
such market share the lower the probability of choosing this partner should become), which 
should reflect the drive for partner diversification for security of supply. Besides, the shortest 
physical distance between the two trade partners and their political relationship are also said 
to be important factors. 
As mentioned in the introduction, LNG and pipeline projects are highly capital intensive and 
front-loaded. On top of this, liquefaction, regasification and transportation account for more 
than 70% of the final border price86 of gas in some projects87. This is the reason for which 
distance is included as the sensitivity of price to the distance (both via pipeline and LNG) is 
relatively high. 
The model opted for is a discreet choice model. Discreet choice models are used when the 
dependent variable is discreet (taking a finite number of possible values, e. g. 0 or 1). Discreet 
choice modelling started by Daniel McFadden (1974) and further developped by jaccard et al 
(2003), Train (2002) and Ben-Akiva (1985). It is widely used in the transportation industry, 
for example Bunch et al (1993), looked at the demand for clean fuel vehicles in California, 
Hall (1983) looks at inter-fuel substitution. 
In this case, the dependent variable is qualitative (a binary, dichotomous, variable is used as a 
dependent variable 
-1 for decision, 0 for no decision). A number of econometric tools can 
be used in this instance, including the Linear Regression Model (LRM) with the classical 
86 The border price is the price paid at the border for pipeline gas and DES (Delivery Ex-Ship) just at the LNG 
terminal 
8 OME (2004) 
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OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). However, with this method, a set of problems arise: While 
the dependent variable would return the probability of dichotomous variable to equal `1' 
there is an issue with the heteroskedasticity of the data as well as result values falling beyond 
the range [0,1]. The former problem can be partly resolved using GLS (Generalized Least 
Square) or WLS (Weighted Least Square) (Goldberger 1964). The latter, however, can only 
be solved with difficulty (Alrich and Nelson 1981). Besides, because of the nature of the 
dependent variable at the estimation stage, the R-Square that LRM regressions would yield 
will not have an explanatory effect. While the LRM methods can, in some instances, be used, 
it is not the desirable methodology otherwise (Cohen et al 1970). 
The LOGIT and PROBIT models guarantee that the estimated probabilities will he in the 
probability range [0,1]. The LOGIT model's logistic distribution function is presented as 
follows: P. 
=1 /1+ (e-X`Q) 
. 
As P goes from 0 to 1, z 
-the distribution function- will vary 
from 
-00 to +00. While the LOGIT model uses the cumulative 
logistical distribution 
function, the PROBIT method uses the cumulative normal distribution function 
[F(1 
=1 /( 2II 
fB 
e-`Z '2dz ]. The PROBIT method is preferably used in systems where 
the level of the dependent variable turns from 0 to 1, or vice versa, due to a threshold value - 
proxied by one of the independent variables (Gujarati 2004). 
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Figure 5-7 Author's diagrammatical representation of the Probit approach using Gujarati (2004) 
Though PROBIT and LOGIT coefficients cannot directly be compared, it is accepted that 
differences in the estimation between the two methods are usually not significantly different 
(Gujarati 2004). The PROBIT method is used for the present paper as some of the 
dependent variables may be thresholds for the change in probability. 
5.3 Model 
5.3.1 Assumptions 
One important assumption is that natural gas is a demand led market. Projects and LTC 
contracts are initiated from the buyers' perspective, subject to availability, feasibility and 
economic viability of the projects from the sellers' viewpoint. This assumption is recognized, 
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from the discussions held, to be a strong one as, to date, the market seems to have been 
behaving this way. 
The monopolistic market structure in domestic markets is also taken as part of the model. 
This assumption however, though true in the previous period, may change due to the market 
liberalization process in the EU, particularly France, Italy and Spain. This is still a matter of 
debate and there are arguments, among academic observers", for and against. This will be 
discussed further later in this chapter. 
Lead-times for projects are assumed to be 4 years from the decision time. Evidently, this is a 
crude average, as some projects take a different time lag than others due to technical or other 
aspects. It is important to mention that it takes about 3 years to build a regasification 
terminal, however it takes about 5 years to build a liquefaction terminal. Also, with 
liberalisation in Europe, and decisions moving from macro to micro, the permitting time 
should also be added to the building time. 
Another important assumption is that pipelines and regasification terminals had the same 
pattern of decision-making in terms of fulfilling capacity. This assumption was discussed 
throughout the meetings held and was seen to be a reasonable one. 
Also, the assumption is made that the same patterns of decision are present in the three 
studied countries. While the three countries have different national policies (e. g. the Spanish 
cap on a single exporter policy), on the economic level, this is a credible assumption as the 
drive for diversification was a unified one at the EU level. On the statistical level, due to the 
data frequency, estimations will carry more statistical significance using the pooled approach. 
88 Bousscnna (2004) and Stern (2004) 
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5.3.2 Model specification 
5.3.2.1 Infrastructure investment 
Estimation 
Dr 
= 
PROBIT (a +, BSPAREt +. GROWTH ) 
D' 
=1- c(-(a +)3SPAREt +. GROWTHt )) 
T (start) 
=T (decision) + Lag 
Lag 
=4 
Validation 
Pt` 
= 
PR OBIT (a + 
, 
8SPARE1 + 3GROWTH t) 
P, '
=1- c(-(a + )6SPAREI + yGROWTH' )) 
P` >_CO =Dt =1 
CO=0.5 
Spare 
SPAREI 
=1- (ý LTC i, e /(I: Capre' + Cappi i, e )), Ve 
Equation 5-1 Infrastucture Decision Model 
Where: 
- 
At the estimation level, D is `1' if an import infrastructure comes online Lag years after, 
otherwise it is `0' 
- 
i, e, t stand for importer, exporter and time (in years), respectively 
-SPARE is the percentage of export capacity that is not used by LTC 
- 
GROWTH is the growth in imports 
-P is the probability of the decision to be made, CO is the cut-off probability, the probability 
above which the model assumes an investment is made. The default 0.5 probability will be 
used in this case. 
-(D is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
- 
Capre is the capacity of import of a regasification terminal of importer `i' at time `t' 
Capp* is the capacity of a pipeline between importer `i' and exporter `e' at time t 
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5.3.2.2 Partner decision 
Estimation 
D, 
= 
PROBIT(a + SPARE, + . GROWTH, '-) 
Dt 
=1- (D(-(a + )6SPARE' + 1. GROWTH' )) 
Dpart; 'e = PROBIT (X ' B) 
Dpart,. e 
=1- (D(-x, )13) 
X= [c, dis tan ce e'', political e'` 
, 
MSt' i] 
Validation 
Ppart, e 
= 
PROBIT (X ' B) 
Ppartý'e 
=1- c(-xßß) 
Exporter(Dpart»e) 
= 
Exporter(max(Ppart»e 
=1- (e X'ß /1+ e- ', O ))) 
MSt'e 
= 
LTC; 'e / LTC, 
Equation 5-2 Partner Decision Model 
Where: 
- 
At the estimation level, Dpart is `1' if a contract is concluded between importer `i' and 
exporter `e' at time `t', otherwise it is `0' 
-1) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
- 
i, e, t stand for importer, exporter and time (in years), respectively 
- 
Distance is the average distance between importer `i' and exporter `e', which is constant over 
time 
- 
Political is a dummy variable describing the political relations between the buyers and the 
sellers and it takes `1' for Norway and the Netherlands and `0' for other suppliers - this is to 
proxy for favoring European countries as long term partners 
- 
MV is the market share of exporter `e' at the importer `i' market at time `t' calculated as the 
sum of long term contract quantities between importer `i' and exporter `e' over the sum of all 
long term contracts quantities between importer `i' and all exporters at time `t' 
- 
LTC is the quantity of the long term contact between importer `i' and exporter `e' at time t 
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- 
At validation, exporters for which the highest probability is yielded are taken to as Long 
Term Contract partners. 
5.3.3 Data 
The following sources were used to collect the data: 
- 
The Gas Strategies Online Global LNG Database 
- 
The Gas Strategies Online European Supply Database for France, Italy and Spain 
- 
The Drewry LNGOneWorld Database 
- 
The BP Statistical Review of Energy 2005 
- 
Data was compared between the different sources and also with press 
announcements compiled by the author. When differences were found, averages 
were taken. 
- 
Data was collected for: 
- 
Regasification terminals, with respective countries, operators, capacities, number of 
trains, vicar of start and other remarks 
- 
Pipelines, with respective importers, exporters and transit countries, capacities, year 
of start and other remarks 
- 
Distance tables between all terminals from Gas Strategies Online 
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Graphs of this data, namely the spare capacity, the capacity- of import and the consumption 
(also, where applicable, production) for France, Italy and Spain, are shown above. 89 
All long term contracts between France, Italy and Spain and their respective suppliers 
(Trinidad & Tobago, Algeria, Nigeria, Russia, The Netherlands, Norway, Libya, Egypt, 
Qatar, Oman and the UAE), their year of start and quantities profiles as well as other clauses 
and 
-where possible- prices. The Distance Matrix of the Gas Strategies Online LNG Global 
Database was used to calculate distances (including Suez Canal in the route) 
5.3.4 Results for `Partner Choice' 
The estimated model discussed above, Equation 5-2, is estimated and yields the following 
results, generated by Eviews: 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.547926 0.119 4.613 0.000 
MS(-1) 
-0.699864 0.424 -1.650 0.099 
POLITICAL 
-0.08276 0.257 -0.322 0.747 
DISTANCE 
-0.000224 0.000 -4.326 0.000 
McFadden R-square 0.375 LR statistic (3 df) 21.244 
Log likelihood 
-131.093 Probability(LR stat) 0.000 
Restr. log likelihood 
-141.715 
Do not choose Choose Total 
Total 224 5? 281 
81 Author's calculations using Gas Strategies Online 2005the BP Statistical Review of WW orld Energy 2()()-) 
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% Correct 81.14 53.05 75.44 
% Incorrect 18.86 46.95 24.56 
Table 7 Results for the Partner Choice Model 
In this partner model, because of the low volume of data at hand, the model was estimated 
collectively, assuming that the three markets behaved similarly. This can be justified by the 
fact that security of supply is more a pan-European issue 
-which the Eli commission 
actively works on- than other issues, particularly infrastructure investment which are more 
commercial driven and therefore a national effect can be envisaged. 
The McFadden R-square (which is the equivalent of the R-square for binary regressions) of 
about 37% shows some good-fit of the data, though Demaris (1992) argues that this 
indicator is not a good estimator of fit 
- 
especially in terms of this model, where the 
importance of the result does not he in the absolute value of the Probit model, rather of the 
relative value of the Probit vis-ä-vis other partners. The best-fit test of the model shows that 
the model performs on 82% correct estimations for not choosing the wrong partner and 53% on 
choosing the right partner, overall a correct rate of 75.44%. This is an indicator generated by 
Eviews that compares, historically, what the model yie lds, using the cut-off probability 
shown in Equation 5-2. 
From the coefficients point of view, distance was found to be a significant (at 99% 
confidence level) and negative coefficient, corresponding to economic theory, as the 
probability of signing an LTC with a particular partner was expected to be negatively related 
to their distance to the buyer 
- 
which is a proxy for the cost, and therefore, a good 
indication of the price. The distance used was in kilometers, hence the low magnitude of the 
coefficient. The intercept, in this case, which is not particularly economically meaningful, 
is 
found to be positive and significant. The coefficient ensures that different suppliers with 
exact]\, the same market shares, distance and political relationship have the same probability 
of being chosen. 
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The interesting result from this regression, however, was the negatively signed and 
statistically significant, at 99% confidence level, coefficient for the market-share (lagged one 
year) of the partner just before signing the contract, which corresponds to our theory of 
diversification of partners which states that the higher the market share of a potential 
partner, ceteris paribus, the lower their probability of being chosen. 
5.3.5 Results for infrastructure decisions 
The infrastructure model, below, was also estimated collectively for the three countries. 
Again in this case, the low volume of data can be expected to hinder the quality of the 
results. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.375 0.532 0.704 0.482 
SPARECAP(-4) 
-2.507 0.927 -2.705 0.007 
GROWTH(-4) 
-0.220 0.136 -1.620 0.105 
McFadden R-square 0.423 LR statistic (2 do 8.045969 
Log likelihood 
-38.72771 Probability(LR stat) 0.004561 
Restr. log likelihood 
-42.75069 
Do not invest Invest Total 
Total 88 15 103 
% Correct 86.64 59.03 82.62 
"/o Incorrect 13.36 40.97 17.38 
The table above displays a relatively high McFadden R-square of 42% and a robust track 
record for goodness of fit, with 86.64 % correct of Do not Irrnest, 59% of Irrrest and 82"'o 
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overall. The spare capacity is significant and negative, as expected. As the lower the spare 
capacity at time t, the higher the probability of deciding for a plant and having it online in 
t+4. The growth of gas consumption did not yield significant coefficients (and of the wrong 
sign). 
5.3.6 Use of the model for forecasting 
This model will not be used for forecasting actual decisions. It is designed to provide a 
benchmark of what decisions would have been taken if the market was still not liberalized. If in 
this state, optimal public utility in terms of security of supplies are met, which is an 
assumption many policy makers agree with. 9° 
Market observers argue that there is a structural break that takes shape in the studied market 
at this time. The EU Commission Gas Directives are being implemented in the market 
"slowly but surely"9". The new structure is expected to end legal monopolies to the profit of 
other organizations which is expected to bring more liquidity, more competitiveness and 
more efficiency to the market, as to make companies evolving in the different EU national 
markets compete on price and quality of service, ultimately 
-it is hoped- offering a better 
product for a lower price. 
However, discussions held with different market players and observers have shown high 
skepticism on this, which is comforting for the assumptions of the model. Though the 
process of liberalization has started and some of the partner and investment decisions do not 
emanate from a clear long term national level, in the medium term, observers expect an 
oligopolistic market structure to emerge and the state to play an important role through 
delivery of construction permits for the regasification terminals, other authorizations for 
pipelines as well as market regulators. At the EU level, therefore, and still on the medium 
90 Discussion with the Security of Supply Department at the French Ministry of Industry (2005) 
91 Personal Communication, DGTREN, March 2005 
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term 
-the horizon at which this model is designed to work- legal and regulator- levers are 
expected to remain and the strategic roles of companies are also expected to stay important 
features of the system. 
On the issue of long term contracts trade structure, which is another one of the assumptions 
of the model, most industry observers seem to agree that it will remain an important feature 
of the market and that it is not expected to change in the medium term 
Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2004), cited above found, running a regression model 
using LTC length, year of signature, contracted volume, LNG vs Pipeline, share of natural 
gas in national total primary energy supply and other country specific dummy variables, that 
while LTC length is decreasing, the structure of the trade relying on LTCs will remain. 
In effect, many of the industry observers and players who were approached to discuss the 
strength of the assumptions seem to agree that the market is not expecting a structural break, 
but a smooth transition that would only materialize in the long run. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter provides an attempt to model decision-making processes for "partner choice" 
and middle-stream infrastructure (regasification) decisions. It is designed to be positioned at 
the "Recognition Level" of the Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) model and at the 
"Feasible Source Level" of the Hayes & Victor (2004) model. Decision-making is assumed 
to be at the macro level 
-i. e. from a country perspective- and other assumptions are made 
with regards to rigid market structure and strategic interest. 
Natural Gas market, especially in the studied area 
-France, Italy and Spain- is a particular 
commodity with different drivers that, it is believed, justifies a whole new perspective on 
decision-making determination. 
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This model is looked at econometrically using dichotomous estimation methods, or discreet 
choice modeling, (PROBIT) taking into account variables that were identified, through 
discussions with a number of industry and government players as well as a number of 
observers, to have a deterministic effect on decision making. 
Regressions have comforted a priori models in almost all cases. Also, low McFadden R 
Squares as well as low significance levels as believed to be the product of the short period of 
time, and henceforth the low volume of data, used. 
5.4.1 Potential for future work 
The framework that the present paper proposes offers many opportunities for improvement. 
On the methodology level, variables thought to have a deterministic impact may be modeled 
using other techniques 
-notably game theory or system dynamic, depending on the data 
involved and the research questions. Unavailability of data being one of the most important 
impediments encountered, there is strong potential in the improvement of the model by 
researching, for example, CIF prices, FOB costs, other terms of the contracts and more 
frequent data. This will offer more degrees of freedom and help lower the missing variables 
problem. 
The next chapter will incorporate the results of both chapter 4 and chapter 5 into a Dynamic 
Object Oriented System and model a view of potential developments in French, Italian and 
Spanish infrastructure and partner mix. 
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6. Modeling LNG trade-flows and infrastructure investment to 
France, Italy and Spain 
In this chapter, a model is constructed using result from previous chapters to model the 
dynamics of gas trade to France, Italy and Spain. 
6.1 Introduction: 
Chapter 2 shows the uniqueness of the trans-border natural gas trade in the Mediterranean. 
This fundamentally different trade structure of the -Mediterranean market lies in its infant 
market liberalization and scarcity of supply and is due to the inherent properties: high capital 
investment, long term contracts, highly strategic middle-stream infrastructure. 
Research relative to the modeling and the forecasting trade flows and infrastructure needs in 
the west-Mediterranean is gaining importance for policy makers. Many examples of decisions 
taken using debatably robust modeling techniques have had important repercussions on the 
market. For example, the Turkish market is believed by the majority of observers to be 
oversupplied because decision makers failed to capture GDP/Gas Consumption elasticity. 
Indeed, due to the recent monetary turmoil, GDP growth was lower in Turkey and so was 
natural gas consumption. Contracted gas, decided on the basis of these forecast meant that 
Turkcvv, is now buying much more gas that it needs. 
Conversch-, new geopolitical developments such as EU integration in a common energy 
policy, which emphasizes the need for environmental friendliness, security of supply and 
market liberalization, are influencing the way natural gas deals are being conducted: The 
recent Repsol/Gas Natural bid on the Gassi Touil plant and the BG stake in the Damietta 
liquefaction terminal in Egypt are examples of this. 
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Last but not least, there is a growing debate on the necessity for more flexible LTCs (e. g. 
length and destination clauses), amid the progressive 
-though slow- formation of a global 
LNG market. Opportunities for arbitrage are affecting, with a growing significance, the 
overall market. 
This paper addresses the modeling of natural gas demand and trade flows with the 
perspective of decision-making needs for governments and involved companies. It provides 
an original, comprehensive, flexible and upgradeable platform for such modeling and 
forecasting taking into express and explicit consideration the particularities of the market in 
the Mediterranean. Inspired by different academic and industrial models, it aims to provide a 
solid modeling methodology that is also industry oriented. 
6.2 Literature review: 
Modeling systems with capacity constraints and step changes, with legal and political 
variables such as the natural gas market, can be constructed with a number of tools. Most of 
the models presented in the literature for natural gas trade are either internal (country level 
or EU level), micro-level, or downstream models. Important tools presented can be used for 
middle-stream trade modeling. There is, however, little presented for middle-stream models 
at the regional and macro levels. 
It is worthwhile noting, on the outset, that downstream models cannot be considered 
appropriate as they disregard the strategic aspect of partners. Internal trade in the EU, either 
through a complex and mature network of pipelines or, in kind, as electricity, can also not be 
considered appropriate in a system where LNG accounts for a large proportion of imports. 
Micro-models are also not appropriate as they place a higher importance on forecasted 
revenues and interaction between agents. 
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The methodologies used in the literature can be categorized into: system dynamics, game 
theory, econometric and other bespoke models. 
6.2.1 Game theory 
In the context of the present research, where there is a restricted number of sellers each of 
them knowing the existence and actions of the other and behaving in an oligopolistic 
manner (i. e. a restricted number of players with a high aggregate market share), Game 
Theory is a good methodology, particularly tacit collusion (of buyers and sellers). 
Tacit Collusion was first introduced by Chamberlain (1929) and stipulates that a market with 
a restricted number of sellers will act, without an explicit agreement, as an oligopoly; as each 
of them knows that a price, and thereby profits, would decrease if they behaved 
competitively and aggressively. Chamberlain suggests that such a principle holds in mature 
markets where there are established sellers, not in low entry barriers markets. 
The Nash-Cournot method, widely used in micro models, was developed by Melvin and 
Warne (1973) and Markusen (1981). For natural gas, Golombek, Gjelsvik, & Rosendahl 
(1995) present a numerical model for the long-run impact of a radical liberalization of the 
West-European natural gas market by studying Cournot producers facing ideal third party 
access regimes for gas transport. They later analyze how the supply side of the Western 
European natural gas market may react if the demand side becomes competitive. The paper 
shows that once the demand side of the market is liberalized, each gas producing country has 
an incentive to break up its gas sellers. The model therefore suggests that there may be 
numerous producers in a liberalized natural gas market. Hence, in a liberalized market 
consumers will not be exploited by suppliers. 
Dierker, Dierker & Grodal (2003) examine from the theoretical point of view the Nash 
Cournot equilibrium on international trade, assuming constant returns to scale and a tnw-o- 
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factor, two-sector and two-country model. In the same fashion as the `oligopoly' theories 
introduced above, Boots, Rijkers & Hobbs (2005) model supplies using the Cournot model 
looking at producers with non-linear production costs. The model presented, GASTALE, 
attempts to integrate capacity constraints into the numerical method inspired from Greenhut 
& Ohta (1979), which looks at situations of multiple consumers separated in space and 
several upstream producers and uses either oligopolistic, or perfectly competitive behaviour 
in the market. 
It is important to note that all research found dedicated to the modeling of supply was 
estimated at the micro-level (many in the United States where the market is highly 
deregulated, where a large number of small operators is present and where high frequcncv 
data was available for a long time). In the market that the present research is pointing at, 
there is historically no aspect of the upstream, middle-stream and even downstream 
deregulation, though the latter is gradually being implemented. A micro-analysis is therefore 
not appropriate. Although some of the literature listed above may have an importance in the 
elaboration of the model for the present research, they remain remote to the fundamental 
supply related modeling factors in the case of the market looked at in the present research. 
6.2.2 General and Partial Equilibrium models 
One of the major researches conducted on the modeling of natural gas trade on a cross- 
boundary basis was a paper published in 1987 introducing a General Equilibrium Gas Trade 
Model, Boucher, J and Smeers, Y (1987), including the market forces in the European 
natural gas market and the predictions drawn in the short run and the long run. The paper 
discusses the future of natural gas supply and demand patterns for the internal European 
market. 
An overview of other general and partial equilibrium models is available in Bhattacharý-ya 
(1996): 
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MSG models 
Author Coverage Details 
Hogan and Australia Base year 1977-78,112 industrial sectors, 
Naughten to study the economy-wide effects of a 15% decline in 
(1990) ORANI production of crude oil 
short run 
Hall et ai. Australia To identify the principal aggregate and structural impacts 
(1990) which result from a substantial switch from crude oil levy 
ORANI-LF1 revenue to product excise revenue 
Mckibbin and Global A multiregional (six regions), multi-sector (12 sectors in each 
Wilcoxen region), intertemporal model 
(1993) A nested CES function system describes the production 
G-Cubed process 
- 
1987 data 
Bergman (1988) Sweden Multiperiod model in which the agents had static or adaptive 
ELIAS expectations 
Distinguishes ex ante and ex post technological constraints, 
as well as different vintages of production 
Bergman (1991) Sweden Static CGE model of an open economy with 45 sectors, 
benchmarked with the 1985 data, includes emissions and 
emission control activities, as well as 
markets, and market prices for tradable emission permits 
Distinguishes between old and new production units in 
some sectors; Considers four types of domestic inter- 
sectorially mobile factors of production-capital, labour, 
electricity, and the natural resource base of the production 
sector 
Bergman (1987) Sweden Seven producing sectors 
The ex ante production functions are defined as nested 
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CES-Cobb-Douglas-Leontief functions. 
Ex post labour is the only variable input and labour 
productivity and energy input coefficients vary according to 
vintage 
Hanson and Norway A two-sector model to analyse the impacts of a tax on SO 2 
Alfsen emissions 
(1986) Generalized Leontief cost function with KLEM inputs 
Consumer's preference is represented by a CES function 
Proost and Belgium A two-period perfect foresight 25-sector model 
Van Dynamic input-output framework with constant return to 
Regemorter scale and perfect competition describes the production 
(1990) possibilities 
OECD (1993) Global 12-region, dynamic model 
GREEN 15 producing sector of which 12 are energy related including 
seven back-stop technologies The model distinguishes 
between old and new capital goods. 
A nested system of CES (except fossil fuels) functions 
describes the production process 
A simple recursive dynamic structure is used 
HHSW 
Author Coverage Details 
Goulder (1982) USA Nine sectors of which five are energy producing ones; 18 
consumer goods which are connected to nine producer 
goods through a fixed-coefficient conversion matrix 
A nested system of cost functions (translog KLEM) is used 
for each industry 
12 categories of households are considered. Consumer 
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demands are derived from a nested system of Cobb- 
Douglas and CES utility functions in which leisure, current 
consumption and future consumption are the principal 
arguments 
Benchmark year: 1973 
Borgess and USA 24 industrial sectors, 12 household categories, and 18 
Goulder (1984) consumer goods are considered 
Three functional forms are tested to analyse the sensitivity 
of results: (i) fixed coefficient for interindustry transactions 
combined with a Cobb-Douglas nest for capital and labour; 
(ii) 
Cobb-Douglas specification for KLEM; (iii) a multi-nested 
structure to combine KLEM 
Consumer demands are derived from a nested system of 
Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions in -, -, which leisure, 
current consumption and future consumption are the 
principal arguments 
Benchmark year: 1973 
Boyd and Uri USA 12 sectors, 13 consumer goods, 6 household categories are 
(1991) considered 
The substitution of capital, labour and land (for agricultural 
and forestry sector) is incorporated through a CES 
production 
function 
Consumer demands are derived from a nested system of 
CES utility functions in which leisure and current 
consumption are the principal arguments 
Benchmark year: 1984 
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Boyd and Uri The 14 producing sectors, 14 consumer goods, and 3 household 
(1993) The substitution of capital, labour, and land (for agricultural 
and forestry sector) is incorporated through a CES 
production function 
Consumer demands are derived from a nested system of 
CES 
Benchmark data: 1983 
Whalley and Philippines 3 regions, three types of energy and two types of industrial 
Wigle (1991a) categories output are considered. Production is represented by CES 
are functions. Oil, gas and coal are not distinguished 
considered 
Pezzey (1992) Global Same as Whalley and Wigle (1991a), only exception is there 
based on are 6 regions instead of 3 regions 
Whalley and 
Wigle (1991b) 
Econometric AGE 
Author Coverage Details 
Hudson and USA Nine industrial sectors, of which five are energy related 
Jorgenson A two-stage KLEM transiog price possibility frontier is 
(1974) used. 
Aggregate energy and aggregate material are generated from 
translog submodels 
A macroeconomic model provides totals for consumption, 
investment, government and export demand 
Data from 1947 to 1971 were used to estimate parameters 
econometrically 
The model presents projections of economic activity and 
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energy utilization for the period 1975 through 2000 
Jorgenson and USA 35 production sectors and 672 types of households are 
Wilcoxen considered 
(1990a, This is an intertemporal equilibrium model, the dynamics of 
1990b, 1993a which is based on intertemporal optimization by firms and 
1993b) households 
Scherageet Data series: 1947-85 
a1. (1993) 
Jorgenson, and USA Similar to the detail in row 2, with the exception of 1344 
Wilcoxen households instead of 672 in those studies 
(1993c) 
Jorgenson, 
Slesnick and 
Wilcoxen 
(1992) 
Hazill and USA There are 36 production sectors but relies on a 
Kopp representative household 
(1990) Translog cost functions are used for producing sectors 
It is also an intertemporal equilibrium model 
Data series: 1958-74 
The National Technical University of Athens, Greece, has developed a number of energy 
modeling tools for the European market and aimed at the policy making community both at 
the European level and at national levels. Below are some of the modeling tools available 
6.2.2.1 Primes Energy System 
The PRIMES model is a static model finding equilibrium by calculating the price allowing 
supplies and demand to match. It takes into consideration environmental policy, taxation 
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and technological advances. The major assumption of this model is price elasticity of 
demand and supply (both the empirical evidence provided in the present research and recent 
IEA reports do not concord with the above assumption). The demand side of this model, 
which is a bottom-up one (refer to the demand section in chapter 4), looks at the demand 
patterns of different sectors and sub-sectors with regards to different primary and secondary 
sources. The model also takes into account different capacities of production, refinery 
capacities, power plant capacities and the network of distribution both on the internal and 
external levels. 
6.2.2.2 GEM E-3 
This is the General Equilibrium Model for Energy, Economics and Environment 
interactions. It is a structural empirical model and takes into account macro-economic 
variables, environment issues and energy regulation, trade and taxation. The model treats 
every country as a separate entity and linking them through endogenous trade. According to 
its manual, the model determines the optimum balance for energy supply and demand, 
atmospheric emissions and pollution abatement, simultaneously with the optimizing 
behavior of agents and the fulfillment of the overall equilibrium conditions. 
6.2.2.3 MIDAS 
The MIDAS system works in the same fashion as the ones above. It includes an 
econometric component for demand which works, again, on a bottom-up approach. It looks 
at a set of important sub-sectors (6 industrial ones, 4 domestic ones and 4 transport ones) 
and deals with over 18 energy fuels. The supply side is a set of sub-models some of them 
engineering and others econometric models (these work in the same fashion as the micro- 
economic approach in the present literature review) for different sources (e. g. electricity and 
natural gas). 
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All of the models above concentrate on the dynamics of the energy within the EU and, in 
the opinion of the author, do not give strong enough consideration to international trade 
flows and security of supply issues. 
6.2.3 Econometric tools 
Research on the modeling of supply, demand and prices for natural gas is not predominant 
in the literature. A noteworthy research is MacAvoy, P. W & Moshkin, N. \'. (2000) which 
aims at predicting long term well-head natural gas prices in the US using simulations and a 
partial equilibrium model. The system consists of simultaneous equations for production 
from reserves and for demands for production in the residential, commercial and industrial 
sectors. A more comprehensive literature review for the consumption and demand can be 
obtained form chapter 4. 
Below is a taxonomy of commodities modeling methodologies proposed in Tamvakis 
(1997). 
NT-o ing What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodology? method is used? specified? commodit 
application 
s 
Market Model Demand, supply, Dynamic micro Interaction Cobalt, 
inventories econometric between decision Energy-, 
interact to system makers in Lauric 
produce an composed of reaching market Oils, 
equilibrium price difference or equilibrium Rubber, 
in competitive or differential based on Soybeans, 
non-competitive equations demand, supply, Sugar, 
142/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
Mode ing What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodolo, n-? method is used? specified? commodit 
application 
s 
markets inventories, 
prices, trade, etc. 
Tungsten 
Process Model Demand and Dynamic micro Interaction Petroleum, 
production economic between decision Steel 
determined difference makers in 
within an equation system industries, 
industry, suitable for markets, national 
focusing on integrating linear economies based 
transformation programming on on demand, 
from product production site inventories, 
demand to input production, 
requirements investment, 
capacity 
utilisation, 
commodity 
inputs, prices, 
etc. 
Svvstcros dynamics Demand, supply, Dynamic micro Interaction Aluminiu 
model inventories econometric between decision m, 
interact to differential makers in Broilers, 
produce an equation system adjusting rate of Cattle, 
equilibrium price which features production to Copper, 
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ing What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodology? method is used? specified? commodit 
V 
application 
S 
emphasising role lagged feedback maintain a Hogs, 
of amplifications relations and desired lei-el of Orange 
and feedback variables in rates inventory in Juice 
delays of change relationship to 
rate of 
consumption 
Spatial equilibrium Spatial flows of Activity analysis Interaction Bananas, 
and programming demand and of a spatial between decision Broilers, 
models supply and and/or temporal makers in Lirestock, 
1. Linear and equilibrium form. Degree of allocating Oranges, 
quadratic conditions complexity shipments Palm Oil, 
programming assigned depends on (exports) and Wheat 
optimally in endogeneity and consumption 
equilibrium method of (imports) 
depending on incorporation of optimised 
configuration of demand and through 
transportation supply functions maximising 
network sectoral revenues 
or minimising 
sectoral costs 
2. Recursive Production Activity analysis Interaction Coal, Iron, 
programming conditions and involving a between decision Steel, 
144/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
MO'k ng What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodology? method is used? specified? commodit 
V' 
application 
s 
input revenue sequence of makers in Wheat, 
determined constrained reaching market Corn, 
through maximisation equilibrium Soybeans 
primal/dual of problems in involves adaptive 
linear which objective intertemporal 
programme. function, processes related 
Recursivity limitation to production, 
introduced coefficients investment and 
through depend on technological 
feedback optimal change 
component primal/dual 
which includes solutions 
profit, capital attained earlier in 
and demand the sequence 
3. Mixed Spatial and Activity analysis Interaction Aluminiu 
integer temporal involving spatial between decision m, 
programming equilibrium and temporal makers in finding Copper, 
embodying optimisation but minimum Fertilisers 
production- also including discounted costs 
process, integer (0/1) of meeting 
transportation, variables to specific market 
and project represent requirements, i. e. 
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ing What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodology? method is used? specified? commodit 
V 
application 
S 
investment capacity project selection 
components additions 
Optimisation Supply and Dynamic micro Interaction Aluminiu 
model demand analysed econometric between decision m, 
in relation to system featuring makers in Copper, 
optimal resource formal cartel- optimising Oil 
exhaustion over fringe models resources 
time and cartel such as that of allocation and 
behaviour monopoly, prices over time 
Stackelberg and in non- 
Nash-Cournot competitive 
markets 
involving 
bargaining 
activity 
Input-output System regarded Input-output Interaction Minerals, 
model as process that model combined between non- Energy, 
converts raw with macro fuel and fuel Agricultur 
materials into economic commodities and e 
intermediate and framework or macro markets in 
final products via disaggregated reaching 
intermediate raw materials materials and 
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M-O ng What is the What What economic Examples 
Process purpose of the quantitative behaviour is of 
Methodologies methodology? method is used? specified? commodit 
V 
application 
s 
processes. balance energy balance 
Investment framework including supply- 
strategies demand 
evaluated in determination 
terms of raw 
material supply 
and demand 
Systems Demand, supply Dynamic micro Interaction Beef, 
simulation model and other major econometric between decision Energy, 
variables and equation system makers Fish, 
objectives which when belonging to the Livestock, 
considered as a formed into a system Multi- 
complete system simulation environment commodit 
rather than a framework is based on v, Rice 
single market coupled with performance 
activity analysis variables such as 
and/or decision revenues, costs 
rules as well as market 
variables such as 
demand, supply, 
prices, etc. 
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6.2.4 Scenarios 
In the early eighties, Shell introduced a new modeling philosophy called the "Shell Scenario 
Analysis". SSA does not have a particular technical tool, though System Dynamics is used 
regularly, but looks at long term, top-down, scenarios. Shell Scenarios has revolutionized the 
way decision-makers look at modelling and forecasting especially in the energy sector. In his 
book "Crise de la prevision. Essor de la prospective : Exemples et methods» (Crisis of forecasts, rise of 
prospective: Examples and methods") Godet (1977) sets the tone for a new way of looking 
at economic modeling by the use of top-down scenarios and sensitivity analysis in decision 
making, instead of simple forecasts. 
In fact, the scenario analysis has become both in analytical and modeling natural gas related 
literature a common tool. The IEA and the EU Commission's publications have scenario 
analysis (base, high, low, and other variable related scenarios). Considine (WiP) uses this 
approach in an econometric model to estimate production of Russian oil. Hartley & 
Medlock (2005a) and (2005b) both use this approach. 
6.2.5 System dynamics 
System dynamics is a powerful methodology and computer simulation modeling technique 
for framing, understanding, and discussing complex issues and problems. Originally 
developed in the 1950s to help corporate managers improve their understanding of industrial 
processes, system dynamics is currently being used throughout the public and private sector 
for policy analysis and design. Energy related research using systems dynamic is numerous, 
one of the research looked at is Powell, Stephen G. (1990b) looking at optimal capacity 
utilization for OPEC countries. The software package usually used is VENSIM (tutorial 
reference in the bibliography). 
Ninios, Vlahos and Bunn (1993) provide a comprehensive overview of the system dynamics 
methodology from a "strategy support model" perspective. Morecroft and van der Heijden 
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(1992), Bunn and Larsen (1992a), Morecroft (1992) are quoted to support the view that 
system dynamics tend to be the preferred technology for industry level simulations. Ninios, 
Vlahos and Bunn (1993) mention that although this methodology appeals due to the user- 
friendly graphical design, its core has remained unchanged since the sixties. Issues identified 
are related to the structure, the focus, the time representation and the reusability. The 
methodology is, according to Peterson (1992), as quoted in Ninios, Vlahos and Bunn (1993), 
"abstract and, in many cases, not the natural way for the less proficient modeler to think 
about system structure" 
The systems dynamics approach, though potentially efficient for some components of the 
model, does not offer enough flexibility to accommodate for the model itself especially 
through the aforementioned software package. 
According to Ninios, Vlahos and Bunn (1993), the Object Oriented method offers strong 
comparative advantages in that it provides for encapsulation (being able to put variables and 
functions together under the form of classes), inheritance (the way in which a class can be 
lower down the hierarchy than another class and would therefore offer flexibility in dealing 
with such systems, and was suggested in organisation modelling by Blanning (1987). 
The Object-Oriented methodology is particularly strong when coupled with a relational 
database system92 which optimises the structure of the data and the inheritance structure of 
the classes. 
6.3 Methodology 
The methodology proposed in the present paper is referred to as DOOS (Dynamic Object 
Oriented System). It is a simulation tool whose mechanics are obtained through calibration 
92 Deleanv (2000) 
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to past behavior of variables and that is suitable to economic systems with legal, political and 
infrastructure constraints. The DOOS methodology also uses a relational database structure, 
normalized on a top-down basis. 
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6.3.1 The Objects 
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The objects are instances within classes. Classes (e. g. pipeline), their variables (e. g. pipeline 
capacity) and their functions (e. g. enable pipeline) are predefined in the model and cannot be 
changed during the running though their contents can be amended. Objects however can be 
edited, added or removed from the system according to a defined rule. The system will 
therefore be dynamically amended. 
lation 
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6.3.2 The Data 
The data, or variables, maybe object specific or `global', they are obtained by different 
means including: 
Expert judgements: forecasts by experts and organisations 
Econometrics: using forecasts obtained from econometric models constructed either for the 
purpose of the present model or for other considerations 
6.3.3 The rules 
The rules maybe are obtained from different sources: 
Expert judgements: forecasts by experts and organisations in terms of policy decisions, 
infrastructure and legal decisions and other rules 
Econometrics: using the LOGIT/PROBIT method or through the inputting of different 
elasticities, discreet choice modelling 
Calibration: by observing past behaviour 
6.3.4 Scenarios and simulations 
The scenarios are sets of dynamic data tables. Each table represents a scenario and 
includes the set of object specific and global variables and rules. The simulation is run for 
each scenario according to predefined constant rules (e. g. if the CIF price in the US east 
coast is higher than the CIF price to Spain plus the shipping cost between Spain and the US, 
and the destination clause in the contract between any supplier to Spain is not active, then 
the cargo can be diverted to the US and more cargo will be required by Spain to compensate 
for that cargo). 
As the table includes information, complete or incomplete, until the end of the time-horizon 
for the simulation, the model runs for period t, and according to the rules, -, -, -here applicable, 
fills the information gap in the subsequent time periods according to the rules. Wehen the 
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simulation runs for t+1, it will take into account the information inputted through the 
scenarios and the information generated by the model and inputted in the information table. 
Modelling Natural Gas Trade: 
D. O. O. S. core simulation 
simulation lncrementation (t=t+1> 
for time t 
Decisions on 
New Infrastructure Data table 
fort+Ior later for 
(new object) t+1 
Decisions 
on LTC for t+l 
Or later 
(new object) External Simulated 
Event at t+l or later 
(e. g. new entrant) 
Figure 6-2 DOOS simulation diagramme 
The variables for which the model provides forecasts are referred to as forecastable 
variables. When the simulation is run for each scenario, probabilities can be assigned to 
each scenario for decision making, or such decision can be supported by the decision- 
maker's belief in such of such scenario. 
On top of this, by running a large number of scenarios, the model can also provide 
sensitivity analysis for, sav, a legal variable or other variables. 
6.3.5 Integrity of the model 
Out-sample forecasting is a potential tool for verifying the integrity of the model. The 
calibration should be conducted on a sample t to t+rt-1 and the simulation run for t+n until 
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t+n+1e using either known information at t+n+k or assumed information at t+n-1. The 
model should be run under one scenario and results thereof should be compared to a 
predefined `Acceptable Level of Errors' for each forecastable variable. 
Estimation and Integrity 
- 
out-sample 
Constraints 
Time Series 
Objects 
Simulation 
Results 
- 
checked against `Acceptable Level of Error' 
Figure 6-3 Verifying the integrity of the model 
6.4 The model 
The graphical representation of the model 
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Figure 6-4 DOOS applied to the Mediterranean gas market 
6.4.1 Assumptions 
- 
The system is demand led: discussed above 
- 
Abundant shipping supply: This assumption is taken as, at the time of writing, 
shipping capacity exceeds total demand and a number of ships are on lay-up 
according to Poten 2004. 
6.4.2 Objects 
" Importer 
" Variables: Comsuption array, Production array, weather 
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" Rules: Caps on imports, Caps on spare capacity, threshold for investment in 
terminal, threshold for negotiation of LTC, partner of LTC 
9 Exporter 
" Variables: Consumption array, Production array, political relation (dummy) 
" Rules: Caps on exports, Caps on spare capacity, threshold for investment in terminal 
" Pipeline 
" Variables: Capacity array 
" Rules: importer, exporter, cap on spare capacity 
" LNG liquefaction terminal 
" Variables: Capacity array 
" Rules: country, caps on spare capacity 
" LNG regasification terminal 
" Variables: Capacity array 
" Rules: country, caps on spare capacity 
" Long Term Contract 
" Variables: quantity array, price array (available in the model, but not used) 
" Rules: importer, exporter, assigned infrastructure, destination clause (dummy) 
6.4.3 Rules 
The rules or the constraints take into account forecasted and assumed variables to make 
decisions for infrastructure decisions and partner choice. Different rules can be used, but for 
this exercise, the PROBIT results of Chapter 5 are incorporated. 
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6.4.4 Econometric Forecasts 
The forecasts obtained from chapter 4 are included as series. This being said, other forecasts 
and scenario forecasts can also be inputted. Also, results from Honore (2005) power 
generation model are also added. 
6.4.5 Scenarios 
The model allows for 3 multiple entries of each value and allows for the separate simulation 
for each "state of the world". Results in chapter 7 show the base case scenario. 
6.4.6 "Generated by Model" 
New dynamic objects that the model generates will be assumed to have attributes that are 
close to the average of that particular country. 
6.4.7 Data Structure 
Because of the links between the objects of the model, data is stored in a relational database. 
SQL" is used to communicate between the program and the database. 
93 SQL is a scripting language used to communicate with relational databases 
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Figure 6-5 Data Structure of the Model 
The following relationships are assumed: 
Country 
-> 
Terminal (one-to-many) 
Pipeline-> Country (one-to-two) 
Contract->Country (one-to-two) 
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6.4.8 Running of the model 
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cape = cap 
l'yuf 
+ cap pipe[e] 
tt 
regas(i] pipet] cap, = CQPt + caPt 
spare 
- 
cap, ' = (cap, '
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=Y quantity"' 
SUM_ ltcý = quantity' 
contratradet "_Y quantity It, [ellil 
weight; '` = contratradet '` / sum 
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_ 
(imports 
- 
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- 
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(spare 
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Equation 3 Functioning of the DOOS 
6.4.9 Integrity of the model 
i,... ý
The aim of the present paper was to introduce the DOOS methodology and to give an 
indication about its reliability and efficiency. An estimation is conducted between 1980 and 
1996 to determine some of the rules and an out-sample analysis is conducted from 1996. It is 
noteworthy that one of the most important features of this methodology, the scenario 
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approach, was not taken as this is an out-sample, not a forecasting exercise. As 
aforementioned, forecasts for the data were obtained using an in-house econometric model, 
scenario variables (such as oil prices) were kept inactive 
-as it is applicable- and forecasts for 
rules were obtained either through the estimation using the PROBIT/LOGIT method"'. 
With hindsight, the market was influenced by many new entrants in this period, new entrants 
are not forecasted by the model, but are included in the information table as scenarios. This 
said, the model has however generated interesting results: 
Below are the predictions of the model and what actually happened: 
Regasification terminals 
Actual terminal Country 
Actual 
Capacity95 Actual date of start 
Predicted 
date of 
start 
Bilbao Spain 2.7 2003 2002 
Rovigo Italy 6 2005 2005* 
Brindisi Italy 4 2007 2006* 
Sagunto Spain 8 2005 2004* 
Liquefaction terminals 
Predicted 
date of 
Actual terminal Country Actual Capacity Actual date of start start 
Bnny Island Nigeria 10.9 2005 2005* 
Ras Laffan Qatar 9.0 1999 2000 
Q4 Refer to previous chapter 
95 BCM (Billion Cubic Feet) 
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The next chapter will put together results of chapter 4,5 and 6 and produce foreasts for 
discussion. 
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7. Putting it all together: Example model result 
This chapter will use the models proposed in this thesis to discuss the current supply profiles 
for France, Italy and Spain. Section 1 of this chapter will discuss the infrastructure for these 
countries. Section 2 will propose a benchmark for the partner portfolios. 
7.1 The Import Infrastructure 
7.1.1 Consumption 
7.1.1.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
- 
The industrial production growth between 2005-2013 is 2% for the three countries 
(normalised assumptions from various sources) 
- 
The weather is assumed to be constant at year 2004 (the weather affects growth either 
way and is important in terms of sensitivity, as discussed in chapter 4, rather than level). 
- 
The production in Italy is assumed to reduce at a rate of 6% (current depletion rate) 
- 
As mentioned in chapter 4, Honore (2005) is used for the power generation forecasts 
- 
Other gas consumption is taken from the IEA (2005) with a growth rate of 1% per year 
- 
The conversion factor from BCM to MTOE is 0.996 
7.1.1.2 Results for France 
96 BP Statistical Rcviev-, 
- of World Energie (2005) 
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Consumption (mtoe) Source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Generated by 
odel, 
ndustrial Chapter 4 16.08 16.29 16.58 16.91 17.25 17.61 17.97 18.34 18.72 19.11 
Generated b 
esid-Comm ode1, Chapte 19.99 20.47 21.12 21.84 22.61 23.42 24.25 25.12 26.01 26.94 4 
Honore 
Power Generation (2005) 1.97 2.00 2.04 2.07 2.10 2.14 2.18 2.21 2.25 2.29 
IEA an 
author's 
Other assumptions 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 
Total Calculated 39.04 39.77 40.76 41.85 3.01 44.22 45.46 6.74 48.07 49.43 
Table 8 Forecasted Consumption for France 
France Forecasted Gas Consumption 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
71 Industrial   Resid-Comm Q Power Generation Q Other 
Figure 7-1 French Forecasted Consumption 
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7.7.7.3 Results for Italy 
onsumption 
(mtoe) Source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Generated by 
Model, 
ndustrial Chapter 4 19.49 19.82 20.27 20.78 21.31 21.87 22.44 23.033 23.639 24.26 
Generated b 
Model, 
esid-Comm Chapter 4 22.75 23.41 24.33 25.35 26.45 27.6 28.8 30.061 31.375 32.75 
ower Honore 
Generation (2005) 20.7 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.201 21.201 21.2 
EA an 
author's 
Other assumptions 1 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.041 1.051 1.062 1.0721 1.0829 1.094 
Total Calculated 63.94 65.44 66.82 68.36 70 71.72 73.51 75.368 77.297 79.3 
Table 9 Italian Forecasted Consumption 
Italian Forecasted Gas Consumption 
90 
80 
70 
60 
w 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
  
Industrial Q Resid-Comm Q Power Generation   Other 
Figure 7-2 Italian Forecasted Consumption 
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7.7.7.4 Results for Spain 
Consumption 
(mtoe) Source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Generated 
by Model 
ndustrial Chapter 4 13.21 14.21 15.66 17.41 19.40 21.64 24.15 26.94 30.07 33.55 
Generated 
by Model, 
Rcsid-Comm Chapter 4 4.50 4.92 5.54 6.28 7.14 8.12 9.24 10.51 11.96 13.61 
ower Honore 
Generation (2005) 3.70 3.83 3.97 4.12 4.27 4.42 4.59 4.75 4.93 5.11 
EA and 
author's 
Other assumptions 3.00 3.03 3.06 3.09 3.12 3.15 3.18 3.22 3.25 3.28 
Total Calculated 24.41 26.00 28.24 30.90 33.93 37.34 41.15 45.42 50.20 55.55 
Table 10 Spanish Forecasted Consumption 
60.00 
50.00 
40.00 
w 0 30.00 
20.00 
10.00 
0.00 
2004 
Spanish Forecasted Gas Consumption 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Q Industrial   Resid-Comm Q Power Generation Q Other 
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Figure 7-3 Spanish Forecasted Consumption 
7.1.2 Infrastructure 
- 
Actual 
7.7.2.7 France 
Supply Source 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
P 
Statistical 
Existing Review 
Pipelines 2005 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Fos Sur Mcr Gas 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 
Montoir Strategies 
Dc Bretagne Online 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 11.34 
Fos Cavou 2006 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 
Consumption As above 39.04 39.77 40.76 41.85 43.01 44.22 45.46 46.74 48.07 9.43 
Table 11 French Consumption with Current Infrastructure 
French Supply Profile Forecast 
nn nn CC' 
IDU. UU 
50.00 
W 
40.00 
30.00 
20.00 
10.00 
000 
ov 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Existing Pipelines Fos Sur Mer I Montour De Bretagne 
O Fos Cavou Consumption 
Figure 7-4 French Consumption and Infrastructure 
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7.1.2.2 Italy 
Profile Source 2004 2005 2006 2007 008 2009 2010 2011 012 013 
Production P 11.70 11.00 10.34 9.72 9.13 8.59 8.07 7.59 7.13 
Statistical 
Existing Review 
Pipelines 2005 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 53.20 
Algerian 
Nfinistry 
of 
Galsi pipeline Energy 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
La Spazia 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 
Adriatic LNG 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Brindisi 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Livorno 
offshore 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Gioia Tauro 
(San 
Ferdinando) 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 
Taranto 
(Apuila) Gas 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Trieste Strategies 
(Friuli) Online 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Priolo 2006 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 
Consumption As above 63.94 65.441 66.82 68.36 70 71.72 73.51 75.3" 77.3 79.3 
Table 12 Italian Consumption and current infrastructure 
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Figure 7-5 Italian Consumption and Planned Infrastructure 
7.1.2.3 Spain 
Pr olo 
Trieste (Friuli) 
IiTaranto (Apuila) 
t_GioiaTauro (San 
Ferdinando) 
ýLivorno offshore 
Brindisi 
Adriatic LNG 
DLaSpazia 
-Galsi pipeline 
r ---I Existing Pipelines 
-Production 
-Consurrption 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Pipeline 
imports 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 8.76 
New 
pipelines 
(MEDGAS) 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
Bilbao 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 5.454 
Cartagena 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 
Huelva 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 7.092 
El Ferrol 2.259 2.259 2.259 2.259 2.259 2.259 2.259 2.259 
Sagunto 5.913 5.913 5.913 5.913 5.913 5.913 5.913 5.913 
Consumption 24.41 26.00 28.24 30.90 33.93 37.34 41.15 45.42 50.20 55.55 
Table 7-13 Consumption and Planned Infrastructure 
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Spanish Supply Profile Sagunto 
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Figure 7-6 Consumption and Planned Infrastructure 
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7.1.3 Model generated infrastructure, example results 
7.1.3.1 France 
70 
60 
50 
w 40 0 
2 30 
20 
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Existing Infrastructure + Planned 
Existing Infrastructure + Model Generated 
Figure 7-7 Model against Planned 
- 
France 
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7.1.3.2 Italy 
Model against Planned 
- 
Italy 
150 
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0 
H 
2 50 
0 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
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Figure 7-8 Model against Planned 
- 
Italy 
7.1.3.3 Spain 
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Figure 7-9 Model against Planned 
- 
Spain 
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7.2 Partner choice 
Below are the results of the partner choice model, using the assumptions listed above. 
New Urports Distn on for France 
°, 325), 
Algeria 97.5% 
Figure 7-10 Incremental portfolio for France (2013 horizon) 
New Imports to tlaly 
-gene 5 4% 
Dater 85 D 
Figure 7-11 Incremental portfolio for Italy (2013 horizon) 
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Oman 295% 
Spanish New Imports 
Nigeria 9 6% 
41geria 9B 
Trinidad 51.26 
Figure 7-12 Spanish Incremental Portfolio (2013 horizon) 
7.3 Discussion & Challenges 
The results above show a continued increase in natural gas consumption in France, Italy and 
Spain, in line with most other forecasts, including the IEA (2004). An investment in 
regasification terminals is expected (and documented in section 7.1.2). This thesis observes 
whether there is a significant mis-match between the current plans to invest in regasification 
terminals and what they should have been under a non-liberalized system. 
7.3.7.7 French market well supplied: because of lag in liberalization? 
The French market is expected to grow as shows Figure 7-1. Chapter 3 discusses the state of 
the French gas liberalization, which stands as one of the slow ones in Europe. Figure 7-4 and 
Figure 7-7 show that the capacity of import in France is ample, with a steady spare capacity, 
roughly until the end of the period. The model generates one more terminal (8 BCM 
capacity) by 2012. In view of this, France is a well-supplied market, which could be a result 
of the lagged liberalization. 
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The model also shows (Figure 7-10) that the incremental gas consumption for the French 
market should mostly be supplied by Algeria (the effect of diversification of supply is over- 
shadowed by the effect of lower cost because of lower distance to market). 
7.3.1.2 Italian market over-supplied: towards Italy becoming a gas hub in the Mediterranean? 
Figure 7-2 shows a steady increase for Italian gas consumption also. One of the interesting 
results shown is a potential tension point in 2007, as shows Figure 7-5, when consumption is 
expected to be higher than the export infrastructure. This could be due to optimistic 
consumption forecasts from the model in chapter 4 or to the assumptions for decrease in 
reserves to be too high. What can also be observed from Figure 7-5, at the post-2008 
horizon, with a number of plants expected to come online, the Italian market will be over- 
supplied. Figure 7-8, shows that the DOOS model also misses the 2007 supply tension 
(model assumes a 3-4 years time lag for investment decisions to materialize and starts in 
2004). However, the forecasts less capacity at the 2013 horizon, reinforcing the point that 
Italy will be over-supplied. 
This over-supply is high in magnitude even disregarding other pipeline projects (Bluestream 
from Russia, other Iranian and Azerbaijani piped gas). However, this over-supply is not 
necessarily negative for the Italian market. It may create a more cyclical pricing profile but, 
given the right investment in re-export infrastructure (pipelines to France and other 
neighboring countries), Italy would position itself as a gas hub and potentially where prices 
for South Europe could start being set. 
The Italian new supply portfolio (Figure 7-11) shows a strong import from Qatar (this is 
validated with current projects with Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum in the Berindisi 
terminal). Italy is closest, in terms of distance to market, to Qatar and farthest from Nigeria. 
Algeria's share remains low due to the diversification effect. 
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7.3.1.3 Spanish market under-supplied, or would demand tail-off? 
Growth in the Spanish gas market has been high and the model expects this robust growth 
to continue, as shows Figure 7-3, a strong demand for Spain is expected by many market 
observers (TEA 2005). However, there is doubt on whether this growth would be at the 
proportions of the late 1990s where gas consumption was growing with double digit rates. 
Figure 7-6 shows the Spanish market to be well-supplied until 2011 where, as Figure 7-9 
shows, the model expects new capacity to be added. However, this under-supply status 
strongly depends on the consumption at the 2011 horizon: if consumption growth slows 
down (below what the model in chapter 4 predicts) the status of under-supply might not be 
realistic. 
Subject to the challenge below, the Spanish market should receive more gas from Trinidad & 
Tobago (again due to the distance to market relative to other market) and from Oman (this 
is validated by current plans for Oman LNG and Union Fenosa). Less gas is expected to 
come from Niger and Algeria because of the diversification effect and the legal constraint. 
7.3.1.4 Other challenges to the models 
Since the time where the model started to be developed and where initial discussions where 
engaged, new developments in the LNG markets, documented in Hallouche & Tamvakis 
(2005), have reshaped the Atlantic LNG market. The US market became an increasingly 
important LNG outlet and deliveries to the EU, even those under long term contracts, were 
diverted to the US where prices where higher. The phase out of the destination clause in the 
EU made these diversions easier. 
The supply constraint experience in 2005-2006 in the UK and similar situations in Spain 
have shown that it is the availability of supply, not the capacity, that could be the issue (the 
UK's Isle of Grain was up and running, but not utilized because of scarcity- of supply, 
prompting prices to reach unprecedented peaks). This is particularly true if the market is 
competitivc and if buyers have to compete for cargoes. 
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One of the other constraints that the model fails to capture is the capacity pressure that EPC 
companies (service companies building terminals and other infrastructure). With a strong 
growth in demand for their service and a resource constraint, particularly human resources, 
costs of procurement of terminals and, more importantly, lag times between decision to 
invest and first cargo regasified, could be higher, with more impact on the local market. 
175/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mfcditcrranean 
8. References 
8.1 Publications 
- 
ADEM (2003), Le Secteur des Hydrocarbures Face aux Enjeux de la 11condialisation, 
Edition Dar el Gharb, Oran, Algeria 
- 
Aissaoui, A (2001), Algeria, The political economy of oil and gas, Oxford Institute of 
Energy Studies, Oxford, UK 
- 
Al-Azzam, A& Hawden, D (forthcoming), "Estimating the demand for energy in 
Jordan: A Sotck-Watson Dynamic OLS (DOLS) Approach", Surrey Eneq, y 
Economics Centre 
- 
Algerian Ministry of Energy and Mines website (www. mem- 
algeria. org/actu/comn/comn-gas-exp-f. htm) 
- 
Attanasi, E. D. (1994), "US North Slope gas and Asian LNG markets", Resources 
Policy, Vol. 20(4), pp. 247-255 
- 
Autorita per l'energia elettrica e il gas Annual Report on the State of the Services and 
the Activity Carried Out, July 2002 
- 
Backus D. K., Crucini M. J. (1998), "Oil prices and the terms of trade", journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 185-213. 
- 
Balestra and Nerlove (1966), "Pooling cross section and time series data in the 
estimation of a dynamic model: the demand for natural gas", Econometrica 34(3) 
- 
Baltaji H& Badi H (1995), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, Wiley 
- 
Bank, Ferdinand E. (2000), Energy Economics: A modern introduction, Kluer 
Academic 
- 
Bank, Ferdinand E. (1987), The political economy of natural gas, Croom Helm 
- 
Beenstock & Willstocks (1981), "Energy consumption and economic activity in 
industrialised countries", Encrgýv Economics (3) 225-232 
16/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Bentzen, J (1994), 
 
An empirical analysis of gasoline demand in Denmark using 
cointegration techniques", Energy Economics 
- 
Bentzen, J& Engsted, T (1993), 
Short and long term elasticities in energy demand 
- 
a cointegration approach", Energy Economics 
- 
Bhattacharyya S. C (1996), "Applied general equilibrium models for energy studies: a 
survey", Energy Economics (18) 145-164 
- 
Bloem, W (2004), Shell Gas & Power, "Future Prospects for LNG", 2°d Energy Risk 
Management Seminar 2004 
- 
Bohi D. R. (1981), "Analysing demand behaviour: a study of energy elasticities", John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
- 
Boucher, J and Smeers, Y (1987), "Economic forces in the European gas market 
-a 
1985 prospective", Energy Economics 
- 
Boussena, S (1995), "L'Energie, le Maghreb et 1'Europe", Revue de 1'Energie, Mars n 
466 
- 
Boots, M. G; Rijkers F. A. M & Hobbs, BY, "Modelling the role of trading companies 
in the downstream european gas market: a successive oligopoly approach", (under- 
review) 
- 
Boots M& Van Oostvoorn F (2003), "Long Term Gas Supply For Filling The 
Supply Gap In Europe Against Affordable Prices", IAEE 26th Conference 
proceedings, Prague 
- 
Brennand & Walker (1990), "Do income elasticities of energy demand depend on the 
level of economic growth? A sensitivity analysis test for OECD countries", OPEC 
Revew, 1990,133-143 
- 
Bros, T (2005), "Ensuring Security of Supply in France in a Changing Environment", 
Sparks & Flame Conference 
- 
Buchananan, W. K. and others (2000), "Which way the natural gas price: an attempt 
to predict the direction of natural gas spot price movements using trader positions", 
Energy Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 279-293. 
177/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Burns, P, Weyman Jones, T. G (1998), "Is the gas supply a natural monopoly? 
Econometric evidence from the British Gas regions", Energy Economics (20) 
- 
Carpos E, GEM System catalogue, National Technical University- of Athens, Greece 
- 
Carpos E, MIDAS System catalogue, National Technical University of Athens, 
Greece 
- 
Carpos E, PRIMES System catalogue, National Technical University of Athens, 
Greece 
- 
Chamberlain (1929) as quoted in Tamvakis (1999), "An economic model for iron ore 
trade", PhD thesis, Cass Business School, London 
- 
Chermack, J. M., Patrick, R. H. (1995), "A well-based cost function and the 
economics of exhaustible resources: The case of natural gas", journal of 
environmental economics and management, Vol. 28, pp. 174-189. 
- 
Chermack, J. M. (1998), "Order 636 and the US natural gas industry", Resources 
Policy, Vol. 24, pp. 207-216. 
- 
Comicion Nacional de Energia 2003, (http: //www. cne. es) 
- 
Commission de la Regulation de l'Electricite 2003, (http: //www. cre. fr) 
- 
Cremer, H& Laffont J 
. 
J. (2002), "Competition in gas markets", European Economic 
Review 46 928-935 
- 
Dahl, C& Duggan, T. E. (1998), "Survey of Price Elasticities from economic 
exploration models of US Oil and Gas Supply", Journal of Energy Finance & 
Development 3-2 
- 
Dahl, C. and Gjelsvik, E. (1993), "European natural gas cost survey", Resources 
Policy 
- 
Davis, N. (1970), "Game Theory A non technical introduction", Dover Publications, 
New York 
- 
Davison, A et al (1988), "Natural Gas: Governments and Oil Companies in the 
Third World", Oxford University Press, Oxford 
- 
Delaney, K (2002), "Inside SQL Server 2000",,, 
1-8/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Demaris, A (1992), "Logft Modeling: Practical Applications", Sage L niversity Paper, 
California 
- 
Dierker, E; Dierker, H& Grodal, B (2003), 
Nash-cournot competition in a general 
equilibrium model for international trade", working paper, University of Vienna 
- 
Di Pascoli, S, Femia, A& Luzzati, T (2001), 
« Natural Gas, cars and the 
environment. A (relatively) `clean' and cheap fuel for users", Ecological economics 
38 
- 
Du Bois Denis, A, Total, (2004), "LNG Trading", 2 °d Energy Risk Management 
Seminar 
- 
Eldegard, T et al (2005), "Short Term LNG Markets", Presentation in the IAEE 
European Conference in Bergen 
- 
Ellis. A et Al (2000), « Structural change in Europe's gas markets : three scenarios 
for the development of the European gas market to 2020", Energy Policy 28 
- 
297- 
309 
- 
Enel web site 2003, (http: / /www. enel. it) 
- 
Energy Charter, the (2003), http: //www. encharter. org 
- 
Energy Information Administration website (2003) (http: //www. eia. doe. gov) 
- 
Engle and Granger (1987), "Cointegration and error correction: representation, 
estimation and testing", Econometrica (55), 251-276 
- 
ENI website 2003, (htt2: //www. eni. it) 
- 
Esnault, B (2004), "Les Enjeux des Reformes Institutionnelles dann le secteur du Gas 
en Mediterranee", Universite Paris Dauphine Conference 
- 
Eviews 4.0 help File 
- 
Eurogas Annual Report (2000), http: / /www. euro ag s_org 
- 
European Union Conclusion of the 6`h Meeting of the European Gas Regulatory 
Forum (2002), Madrid 
- 
European Union Energy Green Paper (2001), http: //europa. eu. int 
- 
European Union Electricity Directive (1998), http: //europa. eu. int 
1-9/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
European Union First Report on the Implementation of the Internal Electricity- and 
Gas Market (2001), SEC (2001) 1957 
- 
European Union Gas Directive (1998), (EU 98/30/EC) http: //europa. eu. int 
- 
European Union Second Gas Directive (2003), (EU 2003/55/EC) 
http: // europa. eu. int 
- 
European Union Website (2002 and 2003), http: //europa. eu. int 
- 
Finon D, Locatelli, C (2000), « Long term competition between gas infrastructure 
developments in Asia. The constraints on the Siberian export development by cross- 
border pipelines", Institut d'economie et de politique de 1'eneregie, Universite de 
Grenoble] 
- 
Finon D, Locatelli, C (2002), « La liberalisation du marche gazier europeen et ses 
consequences pour la Russie », [Institut d'economie et de politique de 1'eneregie, 
Universite de Grenoble] 
- 
Furlan S (2003), "The Effect of Liberalisation of Gas Markets on Trade, Contracting 
and Supply Sector", IAEE 26th Conference proceedings, Prague 
- 
Garcia-Cerrutti L. M. (2000), "Estimating elasticities of residential energy demand 
from panel county data using dynamic random variables models with heteroskedastic 
and correlated error terms", Resources and Energy Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 355-366. 
- 
Gas Natural website 2003, (http: //www. gasnatural. com) 
- 
Gas Strategies Online Database, 2003 (http: //www. gasstrategiesonhne. com) 
- 
Gas Transmission Europe website 2003 (http: //www. gte. be) 
- 
Gaz De France website 2003, (h-tW: //www. gazdefrance. com) 
- 
Global Business Insight (2005), "The western European Gas Outlook", 
www. globalbusinessinsight. com 
- 
Godet (1977) 
, 
"Crise de la Prevision. Essor de la prospective : Exemples et 
Methodes » 
,,, 
- 
Golombek, R; Gjelsvik, E& Rosendahl, E (1995), 
Effects of 
liberalising the natural 
gas markets in western Europe", The Energy Journal (16)1 
180/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the Wiest Mediterranean 
- 
Golombek, R; Gjelsvik, E& Rosendahl, E (1998), 
Increased competition Ot the 
supply side on the western European natural gas market", The Energy Journal (19)3 
- 
Griffin, J& Schulman, C (2005), "Price Asvmetrv in Energy Demand Models: A 
Proxy for Energy-Saving Technical Change? ", The Energy Journal, Vol 26, n2 
- 
Greene WH (2003), "Econometric Analysis", Prentice Hall London 
- 
Groenendaal, W (1998), "The Economic Appraisal of Natural Gas Projects", Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
- 
Gross, E& Schroer, B (1990), "The Use of Spreadsheet Packages in Industrial 
Engineering 
- 
The Case of Regression Analysis With Binary Dependent Variables", 
Computers ind Engng, Vol 18 No 2, pp 129-132 
- 
Gujarati, Damodar N. (2002), Basic Econometrics, McGrow Hill 
- 
Hallouche, H (2005), "Natural Gas in the Mediterranean: a note for the 10`h 
anniversary of the Barcelona Process", IAEE Newsletter, Fourth Quarter 2005 
- 
Hallouche, H; Tamvakis, M& Train, B (2006), "Strategies for Non-OECD Gas 
Producers in the Atlantic and the Middle-East", Oxford Energy Forum, February 
2005 
- 
Hallouche, H (forthcoming), "The GECF: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the making? ", 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies Publications 
- 
Hallouche, H (forthcoming), "Security of supply and security of demand, the place 
for the GECF", Oxford Energy Forum 
- 
Hallouche, H et al (2005), "The outlook for the LNG market at the 2015 horizon", 
3 `d Energy Risk Management Seminar 2005 and quoted in `Spot Trade will Claim 
Increasingly Important Role', Argus Global LNG, July 2005 
- 
Halvorsen, R. (1978), "Econometric models of US Energy Demand", D. C. heath, 
Lexington 
- 
Hafner, M (2004), "The Role and Future Prospects of Natural Gas in The 
Mediterranean Region", Universite Paris Dauphine Conference 
181/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Hartman, R. S (1979), "Frontiers of energy demand modelling", Annual Review of 
Energy (4) 433-466 
- 
Hayes, M& Victor, D (2004), "Factors that Explain Investment in Cross-Border 
Natural Gas Transport Infrastructure: A Research Protocol for Historical Case 
Studies", James Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 
- 
Heal, G. (1976), "The relationship between price and extraction cost for a resource 
with a backstop technology", Bell J. Econ. (7)2 
- 
Heren, P (1999), « Removing the government from European gas)), Energy Policy 
(27) 
- 
Honore, A (2005), "Impact on the Power Generation Sector on Future European 
Gas Demand", Oxford Institute of Energy Studies 
- 
Hotelling, H (1931), "The economics of exhaustible resources", journal of Political 
Economics (2) 
- 
Hsing, Y (1994), "Estimation of residential demand for electricity with cross- 
sectionally correlated and time-wise autoregressive model", Resource and Energy 
Economics (16) 
- 
Iledare, 0.0. (1995), "Simulating the effect of economic and policy incentives on 
natural gas drilling and gross reserves additions", Resources and Energy Economics, 
Vol. 17, pp. 261-279. 
- 
Institute of Economic Affairs Energy Forum, London (2003) 
- 
Instituto Nacional de Meteogologia Espana (2003) website and communications, 
(httl?: //www. inm. es) 
- 
International Association of Energy Economists' 26"' Annual Conference (Prague) 
Proceedings (2003) 
- 
International Energy Agency, Country Review: France (2004), h=: //www. iea. org 
- 
International Energy Agency, Country Review: Italy (2004), http: //ww-w. iea. org 
- 
International Energy Agency, Country Review: Spain (2004), http: //www. iea. org 
- 
International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics of OECD countries (2002) 
182/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
International Energy Agency, Flexibility in Natural Gas Supply and Demand (2002), 
httl2: //www. iea. org 
- 
International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Pricing Under Competition (2002), 
httl2: //www. iea. org 
- 
International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets, Paris (2004) 
- 
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, Paris (2004) 
- 
International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, 2002/2003. 
- 
Jensen, J. (2004) "The Development of a Global LNG Market. Is It Likely? If So 
When? ", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2004 
- 
Johansen (1991), "Estimating and hypothesis testing of cointegrating vectors 
autoregressive models", Econometrica (59) 1551-1589 
- 
Julius, D& Mashayekhi A (1994), "The Economics of Natural Gas, Pricing Planning 
and Policy", Oxford University Press, Oxford 
- 
Jumbe, C (2004), "Cointegration and Causality Between Electricity Consumption and 
GDP: Empirical Evidence from Malawi", Energy Economics 26,61-68 
- 
Kamerschen, D& Porter, D (2004), "The Demand for Residential, Industrial and 
Total Electricity, 1973-1998", Energy Economics 26,87-100 
- 
Kemp, A and Kasim, S (2003), "An econometric model of oil and gas exploration 
development and production in the UK continental shelf: a systems approach", The 
Energy Journal (24)2 
- 
Kim, T. and others (1999), "International Comparison of productivity and its 
determinants in the natural gas industry", Energy Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 273-293. 
- 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the (http: //www. un. org) 
- 
Lagrasta, F. and others, The Natural Gas Market, Managing Energy Price Risk, as 
quoted in Tamvakis, Michael (2002), Commodity Finance Lecture Notes, City 
University Business School 
183/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the Wiest Mediterranean 
- 
Langton, T. (1994), "LNG prospects in the Asia-Pacific region", Resources Policy, 
Vol. 20(4), pp. 257-264. 
- 
Larsen B, Leif Hoegh and Co, CWC World LNG Summit (2002) 
- 
Lien, D., Root, T. H. (1998), "Convergence to the long-run equilibrium: The case of 
natural gas markets", Energy Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 95-110. 
- 
Lin, W. T, Chen, Y. H & Chatov, R (1987), 
, 
The demand for natural gas, electri city 
and heating oil in the United States", Resources and Energy (9) 
- 
Liu L& Lin, M (1991), "Forecasting residential consumption of natural gas using 
monthly and quarterly time series", International journal of forecasting 7 3-16 
- 
LNG 14, Paper Sessions (2004), Gas Technology Institute, USA 
- 
Mabro, R& Wybrew-Bond, I. (1999), Gas to Europe, The strategies of Four Major 
Suppliers, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Oxford, UK 
- 
MacAvoy, P. W. (1983), "Energy Policy: An economic analysis", \X'. \\'. Norton and 
Company, new york 
- 
MacAvoy, P. W., Moshkin, N. V. (2000), "The new long term price of natural gas", 
Resource and energy economics, Vol. 22, pp. 315-338. 
- 
Masih & Masih (1996), "Stock-Watson dynamic OLS (DOLS) and error-correcting 
modelling approaches to estimating long and short run elasticities in a demand 
function: new evidence and methodological implications from an application to the 
demand for coal in mainland China", Energy Economics 18 
- 
315-334. 
- 
Masih & Masih (1996b), "Energy Consumption, real income and temporal causality: 
results from a multi-country study based on cointegration and error-correction 
modelling techniques", Energy Economics 18 - 165-183. 
- 
Medlock, K (2005), "The World Gas Trade Model", James Baker Institute of Public 
Policy 
- 
The Mediterranean Gas Conference 2003 Conference Proceedings organised by 
Alphatania, Algiers (2003) 
- 
i\Ieteo France (2003) «-ebsite and communications, (-itU2: //www. meteQ. fr) 
184/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
Meteo Italia (2003) website and communications, (http: / \i ýt\v. meteo. it) 
Meteo Spana (2003) website and communications 
Miller R (1999), Programming with C++ Lecture Notes, University College London 
Mohamed, Z& Bodger, P (2004), "A Comparison of Logistic and Harvey Models 
For Electricity Consumption in New Zealand", Technical Forecasting and Social 
Change 72 (2005) 1030-1043 
Moral-Carcedo, J& Vicens-Otero, j (2005), "Modelling the non-linear response of 
Spanish electricity demand to temperature variations", Energy Economics, 277-3, 
(369-550) 
Nadaud, F,, "The Demand for Car Gasoline in France: A Long Run Econometric 
Perspective", CIRED, CNRS & EGESS, UMR 
Neuhoff, K& von Hirschhausen, C (2005), "Long Term Contracts vs Short Term 
Trade of Natural Gas, A European Perspective", work in progress 
Neumann, A& von Hirschhausen, C (2004), "Less Long-Term Gas to Europe? A 
Quantitative Analysis of European Long Term Gas Supply Contracts", Zeitschrift 
fur Energiewirtschaft 28,3 
Neumann, A (2005), Long Term Contracts For Natural Gas Supply", IAEE 
European Conference, Bergen 
Nyssens et al, EU DGCOMP, "The Territorial Restrictions Case in the Gas Sector. 
A State of Play", Competition Policy Newsletter, N1 Spring 2004 
Nyssens & Osborne, EU DGCOMP, "Profit Splitting Mechanisms in a Liberalised 
Gas Market: The Devil Lies in the Detail", Competition Policy Newsletter, N1 
Spring 2005 
Ninios, P et al (1993), "Industry Simulation: System Modelling with an Object 
Oriented/DEVS technology", European Journal of Organisational Research 81,521- 
534 
- 
Oil & Gas Journal Countn Information Database (2003), 
http: //ogi pennnet. com/home. cfm 
185/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
OME (2003), "Assessment of Internal and External Gas Supply Options For the 
EU, Evaluation Of the Supply Costs of New Natural Gas Supply Projects to the EU 
and an Investigation of Related Financial Requirements and Tools", www. ome. org 
- 
Paul, S& Bhattacharya, R (2004), "Causality Between Energy Consumption and 
Economic Growth in India: A Note on Conflicting Results", Energy Economics 26, 
977-983 
- 
Powell, Stephen G. 1990b. "The Target-Capacity Utilization Model of OPEC and 
the Dynamics of the World Oil Market. " Energy journal 11(1). 
- 
Pryanishnikov, I& Zigova, K (2003), "Multinomial Logit Models For the Austrian 
Labor Market", Austrian Journal of Statistics, Volume 32 (2003), Number 4,26T-282 
- 
Pyndick, RS (1978), "The optimal exploration and production of non-renewable 
resources", journal of Political Economy 86-5 
- 
Pyndick, RS (1978b), "The structure of world energy demand", MIT press, 
Cambridge, MA 
- 
Ryan, D& Plourde, A (2002), "Smaller and Smaller? The Price Responsiveness of 
Non Transport Oil Demand", The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 42 
(2002) 285-317 
- 
Ryan, D& Plourde, A (2002), "Modelling Sluggish Price Responses in Energt 
Demand Models: A Critical Evaluation of Alternative Specifications", University of 
Alberta 
- 
Sasse A (2000), Object Oriented Programming, University College London 
- 
Savitch, W (1995), Problem Solving with C++: The object of programming, 
Benjamin Cummings, UK 
- 
Smeers, Y. (1997), "Conputable Equilibrium Models and the restructuring of the 
European Electricity and Gas markets", The Energy Journal (18)4 
- 
Sonatrach website 2003, (http: / /ww w. sontrach. dz) 
- 
Stern, j (2002), "Security of European Natural gas Supplies", Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 
186/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West 
. 
Mediterranean 
- 
Stern, j (2001), "Traditionalist vs The New Economy: Competing Agendas for 
European Gas Markets to 2020", Royal Institute of International Affairs 
- 
Stock J& Watson M (1993), "A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher 
order integrated systems", Econometrica 61(4) 783-820 
- 
Tamvakis M (2002), International commodity Trade lecture notes, City, University 
Business School 
- 
Tamvakis M (1999), An Economic Model for Iron Ore Trade, PhD Thesis, City 
University Business School 
- 
UK DTI, "Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future 
- 
creating a low carbon 
economy", www. dti. org. uk, 2003 
- 
UNCTAD Primary Commodity Market information database, 2003 
- 
United Nations COMTRADE database, 2003 
- 
Uri, N. D. (1989), "Natural gas demand by agriculture in the USA", Energy 
Economics 
- 
Urga, G& Walters, C (2003), "Dynamic Translog and Linear Logfit Models: A Factor 
Demand Analysis of Interfuel Substitution in US Industrial Energy Demand", 
Energy Economics 25,1-21 
- 
US Department of Energy Introduction to Systems Dynamics, 
httl2: //www. systemdynamics. org/DL-IntroSysDy: n/start. htn-i 
- 
Vensim Tutorial (2003), (httl2: //www. vensim. com/course. html) 
- 
Yang, Z (1995), 
optimal exporting of exhaustible resources with endogenous trade 
revenue: the case of a resource scarce and capital short economy", Resource and 
Energy Economics 17 
- 
379-404 
- 
Yucel, M. K (1989), "A dynamic model of natural gas deregulation", Energy 
Economics 
- 
Walters, C (2004), Gas Strategies, "Effects of Gas Deregulation in Europe", 2nd 
Energy Risk Management Seminar 2004 
18%/198 
Hadi Hallouche, \1()dclling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Walters C., Bruil J. and Cavill H. (2002), Gas Contract Pricing Information, Gas 
Strategies 
- 
Wright, P (2004), "Liberalisation and the Security of Gas Supply in the UK", EnerLn- 
Policy Volume 33, Issue 17 
- 
Wright, P (2006), "Gas Price Formation in the UK: Markets and Insecurity of 
Supply", Oxford University Press 
- 
Yergin, D. & Stoppard, M. "The Next Prize", Foreign 
. 
-affairs, 
November/December 2003, Volume 82, Number 6 
8.2 Personal communications 
- 
Mr Iyyad Awwad, Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, New York (2003) 
- 
Mr Ali Benbouzid, Sonatrach London (2003,2005) 
- 
Ms. Fatma Zohra Benoughlis, Executive Director of Strategy, Prospective and 
Economics, Sonatrach and Mr Mazari-Boufares, Director of Sratcgv (2005) 
- 
Prof. Sadek Boussenna, Associate Professor, IEPE, University Pierre Mendes 
France, Grenoble, France 
- 
(former Minister of Energy and Mines, Algeria) (2004) 
- 
Mr Thierry Bros, Security of Supply, French Ministry of Energy (2005) 
- 
Mr Johannes Enzmann, Security of Supply, DGTREN, EU Commission (2005) 
- 
H. E. Sameh Fahmi, Egyptian Minister of Petroleum (brief communication in 
London 2005) 
- 
Mr Manfred Hafner, scientific director, Observatoir Meditteraneen de 1'Energie (the 
meeting also included a number of researchers and modellers within OME) (2004) 
- 
H. E. Chakib Khelil, Algerian Minister of Energy and dines (brief communication in 
Algiers, Algeria 2005) 
- 
Dr Andre Plourde. 
, 
Departement of Economics, LTniversin- of Alberta, Canada, 
(2005) 
- 
Dr David Ryan, Department of Economics, University of Alberta, Canada, (2003) 
188/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Moddlbng Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
- 
Mr Mohammed Sultan, Qatar Representation to the United Nations (2003) 
- 
Mr Chris Walters, Head of Consulting, Gas Strategies London, (numerous 
discussions and presentations) (2003-2005) 
- 
H. E. Erik Williams, Trinidad & Tobago Minister of Energy (brief communication in 
Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, 2005) 
- 
Mr Aziz Yahiai, Short Term Energy Markets, OPEC (2004) 
- 
Other personal communications with GDF, Total, EDF were held on the margins of 
the Mediterranean Gas Conference, held in Algiers in September 2003. Other 
communications were held with a number of gas exporters on the margins of the 
Gas Exporters Forum meeting in Port of Spain, April 2005 
8.3 Data sources 
- 
Cedigaz, Natural Gas in the World (2004) 
- 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2005) 
- 
TEA OECD Energy Statistics (2003) 
- 
IEA OECD Energy Prices and Taxes (2003) 
- 
Gas Strategies Online (2005,2006) 
- 
Drewry LNG OneWorld Database (2005) 
- 
Datastream, Thomson Multimedia (2003,2004,2005) 
- 
IMF International Financial Statistics, (2003,2004) 
189/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
9. Appendices 
190/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
191/198 
Hadi Hallouche, Modelling Natural Gas Trade in the West Mediterranean 
Appendix 1: User Friendly Version of the Model 
Below are snapshots of a user-friendly graphical interface that was built for this model using 
C++ Builder and a MS ACCESS database. 
BUc. iness SChoo 
_, v! 
DOOSý 
Dynamic Object Oriented System 9 
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2006 1 1 1 0 00 71.5 68. 25 74 75 
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2008 1 1 1 0 00 86 5149993E 75 24562831 98 85687251 
2009 1 1 1 0 00 95.16649627 79 0079040`_113.685409` 
2010 1 1 1 0 00 104 6831512 82 9583053`_130.738220 
Cass (iL6-Il 
'', '. 
School 
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I. A m 
Barcelona 
Bilbao 
Bonds, 
DIM- 
EI Ferrol 
Fos Cavou 
View Reges Cartagena importer Spain 
dat capl cap2 cep3 capacityl I capacity2 capacity3 
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Picture of an LNG regasification terminal in Belgium"' 
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